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THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: FROM NONCOMMUNICATION TO
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Mary Jeanne Patrick, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1979
After more than two decades of fundamental differences
due to lack of direct diplomatic relations, the People's Republic
of China and the United States are developing a harmonious working
relationship.

Friendly relations between these two major nations

began to improve in 1972 during President Richard Nixon's v is it to
China that had been arranged by Henry Kissinger, Assistant for
National Security A ffairs.
The purpose of this thesis is to show that nations can
overcome th e ir negative stereotyped images with one another when
th e ir leaders w ill enter into effective communication.
Chapter I considers the historical aspects of the SinoAmerican relationship.
Chapter I I discusses the American Foreign Policy of con
taining the People's Republic of China.
Chapter I I I examines the China policy of the Nixon Presidency.
Chapter IV examines the implementation of the changed China
policy during the Ford and Carter administrations.
Chapter V analyzes the benefits of the changed China policy.
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PREFACE

During the past century two of the major countries bordering
the Pacific, China and the United States, have been involved in wars
and rumors of war.

Many private citizens of both countries fear

another war in this nuclear age.

Both Richard M. Mixon and Henry A.

Kissinger shared sim ilar views regarding China.

One year prior to

being elected President of the United States, Mr. Nixon in an a rtic le
en titled "Asia After Vietnam" published in the October 1S67 issue of
Foreign Affairs commented:
We cannot afford to leave China forever outside
the family of Nations, there to nurture its
fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its
neighbors. . .
The world cannot be safe until China changes.
Our safety depends upon the extent that we can
influence eventsJ
Shortly a fte r being elected President, Mr. Nixon appointed
Henry A. Kissinger to be his Assistant for National Security Affairs
and by the end of 1973, Secretary of State.
Mr. Kissinger had definite ideas about the importance of
China and Asia to American foreign policy:
No region in the world is more dynamic, more
diverse, or more complex than Asia. Americans
have fought three major wars in Asia. American

^Nixon, Richard M., "Asia After Vietnam." Foreign A ffairs ,
Vol. 46, No. I (October 1967):121.
vi
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prosperity is inextricably linked to the economy
of A sia'. . .
He further states:
Our security relationship with China is crucial
to the global balance of power.2
Both Kissinger and Nixon realized that world events had taken
such a turn that the time had come to break through the twenty year
freeze of ostracizing the People's Republic of China and deal with
that nation on a de facto basis.

The myth of monolithic Communism

had been abandoned by the American government with the increase of
Soviet power.

I t was apparent to Kissinger and Nixon that China

(with one fourth of the world's population) presented a grave threat
to world peace i f she were not brought back into the family of
nations.

The many years of nonrecognition coupled with the b itte r

lessons of Korea and Vietnam forced both men to the realization that
the China policy had to be altered rad ically.

They believed that the

United States should try to establish effective communication with
the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

This would further

world peace and particularly help protect United States' security
interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
Nixon and Kissinger had realized th e ir program in regard to
China by 1972 by establishing a working relationship with the leaders
of mainland China.

^Kissinger, Henry A. American Foreign Policy, 3rd Ed.
(New York: W. W. Horton and Company, 1977), p. 414.
^ ib id ., p. 417.
vi i
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The purpose of this thesis is to show that nations can over
come th e ir negative stereotyped images with one another when th e ir
leaders w ill enter into effective conmunication.
This subject of reciprocal stereotyped images w ill be dis
cussed in four chapters which are topically arranged.
Chapter I considers the historical aspects of the SinoAmerican relationship.
Chapter I I discusses the American Foreign Policy of contain
ing the People's Republic of China.
Chapter I I I examines the China policy of the Nixon Presidency.
Chapter IV examines the implementation of the changed China
policy during the Ford and Carter administrations.
The Conclusion analyzes the benefits of the changed China
Policy.
I t is important for the general public, as well as government
o ffic ia ls , to be well informed by having thorough knowledge of both
sides of a problem before forming an opinion.

Public persuasion can

play an important part in influencing government policy makers to
act in a constructive or destructive manner.
Chinese, as well as Americans, are repeatedly reminded of
disturbing past incidents, along with the la te s t alarming events
involving the two nations.

Radio and television news flashes, plus

newspaper e d ito ria ls , a rtic le s and cartoons are featured d aily.
While there is no lack of information, there never has been
such a vast amount of technological means for spreading propaganda.
I t is interesting to observe the omission o f-v ita l news that could
vi i i
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be detrimental to the speaker's opinion of the subject matter by
listening to d iffe re n t versions of the same news dispatches.
Americans continue to learn from studying United States'
history books that th e ir country has always been among the f ir s t
countries to o ffe r and give assistance to China at the time of
famines caused by droughts, floods, and earthquakes.
United States senior citizen s, especially those or th eir
families who were contributors to church and club drives that raised
money to erect churches, hospitals, schools and colleges in China,
find i t d if f ic u lt to understand the hostile attitud e of many Chinese
people.

Far too few Americans are aware of the fact that th e ir

country was associated with aggressive European countries along
with Japan and Imperial Russia that threatened and almost succeeded
in dismembering China and fin a lly reducing that once proud nation to
a semicolonial status.
Deep rooted psychological causes of resentment and dislike
should be exposed, discussed and corrected i f possible.
The purpose of this thesis is to show that nations can
overcome th e ir negative stereotyped images with one another when
th e ir leaders w ill enter into effective communication.

But this

interaction w ill only take place when a ll parties concerned believe
that effective discussions are in th e ir best interest.

Policy

makers can better understand and deal with current conditions when
they have a background of knowledge regarding the behavior and mis
takes of previous United States and Chinese policy makers.

I t is

hoped that present day leaders w ill deal more e ffec tiv ely with each

ix
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other and overcome negative stereotyped images a fte r examining
policy choices of e a rlie r Chinese and American decision makers.

x
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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL ASPECTS
"C ivilizin g Mission"—Pauperization of China by
the Imperialists Including the United States
In order to understand why China was economically so
attractive to the Im perialist nations, we need to f i r s t look at
her from the geopolitical standpoint.

According to the theory of

geopolitics the world contains only a lim ited amount of space and
natural resources; a ll states are involved in a never-ending
struggle among themselves to capture what they view as necessary to
maintain th e ir liv in g standards.

Geopolitics trie s to describe the

relationship between p o litic a l and economic geography to foreign
policy.

By geopolitical expansion in China the Great Powers were

attempting to achieve greater national economic security and power
for themselves at home.

In the nineteenth century these states

a ll vied for control of the te rrito ry and commerce of the Chinese
continent and trie d to secure that interest by use of force.
To have a better understanding of present day conditions in
China, i t is necessary to b rie fly glance at early Chinese contact
with European im perialist nations beginning in the sixteenth century.
Our f ir s t attention focuses on Portugal, England, Holland, and
Imperial Russia.

By the nineteenth century i t was a ll China could

do to retain her iden tity as a legal e n tity .

Both her national

1
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sovereignty and culture were under attack by external and internal
agents as represented by the Western powers and domestic revolu
tionaries.

The areas of active interest and appetite of these states

included colonial India, the Pacific islands and extended also to a
semi colonized China and a s t i l l sovereign Japan.
This early Western Imperialism resulted from Europe's
Commercial and la te r Industrial Revolutions.

By economic exploita

tion of underdeveloped nations, the Im perialist nations could extend
th e ir prestige, commerce and power throughout the world.

Aside

from missionary a c tiv itie s , they were especially interested in the
Far Eastern natural resources that were waiting to be tapped and
greatly needed for th e ir industries.
The c iv iliz a tio n of China extends back 4,000 years and is
continuous as the world's most ancient surviving state and culture.
The Chinese c iv iliz a tio n is much older than the European not to
mention the United States.
Until the late Middle Ages the Chinese c iv iliz a tio n was
not demonstrably behind the institutions and technologies developed
by the West.
By the end of the seventeenth century the im perialist traders
appeared in China in force.

English traders were the most numerous,

followed by the French, Russians, and Americans.

I t is interesting

to note that a ll of the Imperialists except Imperial Russia advanced
on China from the sea.

At this time the Western Power's trading

center was located at Canton.

In contrast to the Western Powers

the Russians exploited the ancient overland caravan trading routes
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leading to China.

To the B ritis h , tea was the most lucrative

product of exchange fo r the p ro fit of the B ritish East India
Company.
The extension of this European control in the nineteenth
century.was made possible by seventeenth century trading companies,
the most successful of which were the B ritish East India Company
and the Dutch East India Company.
In 1600 the B ritish East India Company was chartered by the
English Crown for the purpose of trade with the East Indies.

It

was required to establish a settlement and maintain order in re
turn for a monopoly over commerce.^

England la te r established

trade with China through the company's factories there.

This

company was the spearhead to British trade in China and eventually
overtook the Dutch East India Company in importance.
China's Foreign Policy Toward the West Characterized
by Isolation, Suspicion, and Ambivalence
China for four thousand years had developed a high level
of c iv iliz a tio n despite her periodic isolation and her conquests.
She became a popular commercial center a fte r a land trading route
was opened in Asia during the f ir s t century B.C.

Moslems were among

the f ir s t to locate in China's border areas, as they established
restaurants and curio shops along the highway.

Buddhists monks soon

^Lancaster, Edward. A Manual of English History (New York:
American Book Company, 1900), pp. 247-248.
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joined the merchants and traders who taveled by mule and camel
caravans.

The commercial travelers transacted business and continued

on th e ir way.
China.

The Buddhists, however, had no intention of leaving

They were there for the purpose of converting the Chinese

people to th e ir relig io n .

I t was China's policy to welcome visitors

regardless of th e ir mission.
I t was not until the la te r Han period that the sea route
around Arabia and across the Indian Ocean was completed.

Trading

vessels could then anchor a t a ll major ports along the southern
coastline of Asia.

China's friendly hospitality was well known

along the trade routes.

People from many countries not only

stopped at the trading port to trade or purchase choice articles
made of s ilk or china but remained permanently.

The uninvited new

comers included Persians, Tartars, Syrians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs,
Orthodox and Nestorian Christians.^

They enjoyed religious freedom

and were permitted to locate wherever they wished.
China's knowledge of not only the a rts , but government,
p o litic a l systems, history and religion increased enormously until
the sixteenth century.
China's policy of se lf-is o latio n
After welcoming unexpected, courteous travelers for many
centuries, the Chinese were shocked when they opened the c ity gates

\a to u r e tte , Kenneth Scott. A Short History of the Far East
(New York: MacMillan, 1965), p. 119.
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to find Portuguese invaders who had come fo r the double purpose of
conquest and religious conversion.

The im p erialistic invaders were

driven from the Canton anchorage and the gates of the c ity were closed
and locked.
Island.

China's trading port was then established on Whampoa

A new policy was introduced which lim ited trade to the one

island port.

Diplomatic relations were denied and foreign embassies

were no longer welcome.

China's opportunity for sharing knowledge

with other countries was d rastically lim ited.
The Chinese people gradually lost interest in the outside
world and were contented with th e ir own self-sufficiency.

This

isolation caused them to build up a self-image of superiority.
China had existed for over four thousand years.
educated although isolated.

She was s e lf-

She would continue to honor her ancestors

who had made th e ir country great and revere China's beloved philosopne
Confucius who had taught the Brotherhood of Man:

"What I do not wish

to have done unto me, I likewise wish not to do unto others."^
China was not prepared fo r war on land or sea at that time.
Her army and navy were weak and weapons outmoded.

One hundred years

previous to the Portuguese invasion, China had naval supremacy on the
southern seas.

I f her defense had been maintained the Portuguese,

Dutch, English plus a ll of the rest of the previously named imperi
a lis tic nations would possibly not have attempted to colonize or
take possession of that vast country with its immense population.

^E lio t, Charles W.
Harvard Classics Vol. I (New York:
B. F. C o llie r, 1938), p. 16.
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Raw materials as well as choice craftsmanship article s could have
been purchased or traded without bloodshed.
The Portuguese encounter was one that Chinese scholars
have never forgotten.

I t was the f ir s t warning of the te rrib le

im perialist invasion that awaited th e ir country.

Beginning at that

time foreigners from the Western countries were identified as
"foreign devils."^
The f ir s t European to open up a direct exchange of informa
tion with China a fte r the Portuguese invasion was Matteo Ricci, a
Jesuit missionary, who was also a learned scientist.
China in the late sixteenth century.

He reached

I t is important to mention

Ricci because he was also a victim of China's isolation policy.
Ricci, as the merchants, was restricted to Whampoa Island.

There

he dressed as the Chinese, learned th e ir language and was eventually
permitted to locate on China's mainland where he exchanged knowledge
with the Confucian scholars.

The Jesuits were la te r banished from

China as they obeyed instructions from the Pope before adhering to
Chinese customs and laws.

The emperor of China v/as recognized by

the Chinese people as the divine ruler; he would not permit outside
dictation.

China's gates to the Mainland were closed and locked

again.
The Manchu invasion
In 1644 a tribe of barbarians known as the Manchus from

^Fitzgerald, C. P. Horizon History of China (New York:
American Heritage, 1969), p. 339.
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southern Manchuria invaded and conquered China overthrowing the
Ming Dynasty.

They set up the Ch'ing dynasty and ruled until 1912.

During the period of the f i r s t three Manchu emperors, K'ang-hsi,
Yung Cheng, and Ch'ien-Lung, China reached a degree of power and
wealth equal to any previous Chinese dynastyJ
The f ir s t Manchu leaders respected the ancient Chinese
p o litic a l system.

They continued to observe and practice the

ethics and laws found in the "Shu-Ching" that treats of laws, history
and government along with the Confucian Classics and the famous
historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien's "Shih-Chi" (Records of the Historian)
estimated to have 1,500,000 words.

Ssu-ma Ch'ien's work has re

mained to the present day one of the chief sources of knowledge of
China before the Han Dynasty.

2

In 1685 Emperor Kang-hsi decided to change China's isola
tion policy by permitting commerce with the outside world.

This

change was based on China's m ilitary strength and her sense of
security.

The Emperor ordered a ll Chinese ports opened for trade.

The following year, the British East India Company arrived bag and
baggage and established factories in Amoy and Canton.

European

traders soon arrived in force, a factor that proved to be a devastating
blow to the traditional Chinese p o litic a l system, even though the

^Mosley, George. China Since 1911 (New York:
Row, 1968), p. 12.
^Hay, John.
pp. 46-47.

Ancient China (New York:

Harper and

Harry Z. Walck, 1979),
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"Open Port" policy was rescinded in 1757.
Until about 1800 the Manchu or Ch'ing era was a period of
s ta b ility but lim ited c re a tiv ity .

Emperor Ch'ien-Lung (1736-1795)

was the la s t competent Manchu emperor.

Toward the end of the aged

ru le r's reign, however, conditions began to change in China.

There

was increasing discontent due to growing governmental inefficiency
and corruption.

China began to lag further behind both in m ilita ry

technology and organization.

The Manchus found i t d if f ic u lt to pass

the c iv il entrance examination even though the standard was lowered
for them.
F irs t Sino-American contact
After the Revolutionary War, merchants and traders livin g
in the new American Republic, found i t d if f ic u lt to enter the com
mercial world without a trading agreement or c re d it.

There were no

questions asked by the hong^ merchants of China's trading port
located on Whampoa Island.

The United States merchants were given

permission to anchor th e ir l i t t l e privateer and unload the cargo
of furs, raw cotton and ginseng and take the a rtic le s to a display
room in a factory.

The American's small vessel, the "Empress of

China" was packed with tea, s ilk and chinaware, when ready for the

Fitzgerald, op. c i t . , p. 342. "Before 1840 a ll foreign
trade with China was conducted through the Treaty Port of Canton.
There government-franchised monopolies known as hongs bargained
with representatives of the equally monopolistic B ritish East
India Company."
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return t r ip .

According to Samuel Shaw, the commercial o ffic e r on

the l i t t l e privateer, in his report the voyage totaled "an over-all
p ro fit of $30,000."^

The United States had been able to establish

its credit in China.

Shaw's account of a conversation with one of

China's merchants before leaving seemed to have a prophetic warning
You are not Englishmen? . . . But you speak
English word, and when you f ir s t come, I no
can t e ll difference; but now I understand very
w ell. When I speak Englishman his price, he
say "so much—take i t —le t alone." I told him,
"no my frien d , I give you so much." He look at
me— "Go to h e ll, you damned rascal; whatl you
come here—set a price my goods?" . . . I see
very well you no hap Englishman. All Chinaman
very much love your country.2
The hong merchant then prophecied:
All men come f ir s t time.China very good gentle
men, a ll same you. I think two three time
more you come Canton, you make a ll same English
man too. ^
China's M ilita ry Impotence and Weakness
The f i r s t opium shipped to China was used for medicinal
purposes.

When Emperor Yung-cheng issued a decree to prohibit

opium t r a f f ic , the import was s t i l l small amounting to 200 chests
(each chest weighed approximately 133 pounds on the average).4

t u l l e s , Foster Rhea. China and America (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 2.
2

loc. c i t . , p. 5.
3
loc. c i t . , p. 10.

4L i, Dun J. The Ageless Chinese (New York:
Sons, 1971), p. 392.

Scribner and
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"The B ritish East India Company began exporting opium grown in
India in 1750 and . . .
4,054 chests."^

by 1790 the import from India alone reached

Regardless of repeated imperial decrees prohibit

ing the importation of opium, the drug was carried to China by
private B ritish and Indian traders, as well as by Americans who
competed as best they could by buying opium in Turkey.

" I t was

reported that 8 or 10 vessels owned by Americans and operated under
the American flag were engaged in the contraband trade in 1849."

2

Yet the bulk of the trade and the largest percent of profits went to
the B ritish .

As a result o f the drug t r a f f ic , China's economy

suffered from the loss of s ilv e r.

Taxes were paid in s ilv e r, but

the majority of the Chinese were paid in copper and the rate of
exchange was not fixed.

Opium imports from 1831 to 1836 had pro

duced an estimated loss of 30 m illion taels of s ilv e r to the royal
treasury.^
Foreign traders restricted to Whampoa Island found conditions
intolerable, especially the B ritis h , fo r whom freedom of trade was a
sacred thing.

Finally in 1793, Lord George Macartney was sent by

King George I I I to the Manchu court of Chien-lung.

The B ritish

request to open negotiations to remove trade restrictions and to

1i bid.
2

Rea, Kenneth W. Early Sino-American Relations 1841-1912
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), p. 123.
3
Yang, Richard and Lazzerini, Edward. The Chinese World
(St. Louis: Forum Press, 1978), p. 31.
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establish an ambassador permanently in Peking were firm ly but
courteously denied by the court o ffic ia ls .

Macartney then caused a

disturbance at the court by refusing to kow-tow before the Emperor;
he then was ordered to leave China.
The distinguished British lord was impressed by the wealth
and luxury of China's e lite as well as the poverty among the peasants,
but a fte r a ll sim ilar conditions existed in England as well as other
states.

Macartney's mission was not fru itle s s , however, as he

verified the reports of China's natural resources.
that China had passed its peak.

He also noted

The nation was weak, the army out

moded and widespread corruption was apparent in a ll branches of the
government.

I f China's resources could not be obtained peacefully,

there were other ways of procuring them.
In 1819, a fte r the British successfully mastered India, they
purchased Singapore.

Then they quickly advanced in to Malaya, then

on to Burma in 1826.
At the time of Lord Macartney's departure from China, King
George I I I was notified that there was no need for further exchange
of products as China possessed everything needed and most certainly
did not want ille g a l opium.
Portugal was responsible for bringing the opium drug to
China from Goa in 1729.
Opium addiction had spread from members of the gentry class
to artisans, merchants, women, Taoist priests and Buddhist monks.
Lin Tse-hsu, la te r the Imperial commissioner at Canton,
warned:
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The country w ill become poorer and poorer and
its people weaker and weaker. Eventually not
only w ill there be inadequate funds to support
^
an army, there w ill be no useful soldiers at a l l. .
John King Fairbank in his book The United States and China
assesses the impact of the opium trade:
In China the opium trade remains a classic symbol
of Western commercial imperialism—foreign greed
and violence demoralizing and exploiting an
inoffensive people.
In 1839 Emperor Tao-kuang fin a lly summoned the court o ffic ia ls
to a special meeting at which time Lin Tse-hsu, a high ranking
mandarin, was appointed commissioner at Canton.

Lin was then

authorized to confiscate the enormous stocks of opium that were
stored in the B ritish and American sections allotted to them at the
Canton port.

After forcing th e ir entrance into the specified section,

the authorities found over 20,000 chests of opium stored and ready for
sale.

They publicly destroyed the drug on the Canton beach.

Sir

Charles E llio t, the B ritish superintendent, promptly notified his
Government and convinced them that the Chinese confiscation of th e ir
property was unjustified and an insu lt to the British Crown.
Instead of putting a stop to the smuggling, the Chinese
Government had precipitated the Opium War.

Chinese consumption

of opium continued despite the Opium War which lasted from 18391842.

By 1842 the Chinese people were purchasing 35,000 chests of

the drug a year.

9

^Li, op. c i t . , pp. 392-393.
2

Rea, op. c i t . , p. 123.
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Superintendent E llio t refused to acknowledge the rig h t of
the Chinese to destroy B ritish property and broke o ff a ll trade
relations.

The English merchants were then transferred to Macao.

In this policy E llio t was supported by Lord Charles Napier, Chief
Superintendent of Trade and the United States consul Peter W. Snow
who was stationed in China.

"The American merchants were under no

control, subject to no law, except that of s e lf-in te re s t and refused
to endanger th e ir own position."^

They adopted a policy of n eu trality

and signed a bond agreeing to have nothing to do in the future with
opium.^
After receiving Superintendent E llio t's message, B ritish
troop carriers and men-of-war were quickly dispatched from the
B ritish colony of Singapore.

Without waiting for a formal declaration

of war, the B ritish destroyed the Canton forts and started up the
coast.

The clumsy Chinese war junks were no match for the modern

B ritish vessels.

The Manchu bannermen who had enjoyed peace for

two centuries were not prepared to meet well trained m ilita ry men
fo rtifie d with the la te s t weapons.

The Manchu Government did not

sue for peace, however, un til the c ity of Nanking was threatened
in 1842.
The era of Unequal Treaties began with the Treaty of Nanking
that was imposed upon China on August 29, 1842.

Winning the Opium

War was a very crucial victory for the p o litic a l and commercial

^Dulles, op. c i t . , p. 21.
2
Dulles, op. c i t . , p. 21.
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interests for not only England but a ll Western Im perialists.

China

had become a semi-colonized nation in its relationship with the Great
Powers as a result of these unequal tre atie s.

This state of a ffa irs

would continue un til World War I I .
The Treaty of Nanking called for the opening up of five
ports— Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai.

I t recognized

the legal equality of foreign nations with China by permitting
consuls to reside in these same c itie s .

Hong Kong was ceded to the

B ritish by "Ch'i'shan, a Manchu Solid Yellow Bannerman, hereditary
marquis of the f i r s t grade. . .

He entered o ffic ia l l i f e on account

of b irth , rather than through c iv il service examination. . .
Chinese customs duties were lim ited to fiv e per cent, a provision
which protected manufactured imports from abroad and impeded the
growth of Chinese industry.

The British exacted an indemnity equal

to twenty-one m illion pounds of sterlin g .

As is often the case the

lower income citizens had to bear the burden of heavy taxation.
Share and share alike
Alarm was f e l t in Washington when the Treaty of Nanking
was signed.

I t was feared that Great Britain would secure t e r r i

to ria l concessions that would exclude the United States.

To guard

against this danger a special mission headed by Caleb Cushing was
sent to negotiate a treaty with China that would give the United
States every rig h t which Great B ritain had won from China as a

‘ Rea, op. c i t . , p. 3.
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result of the Opium War.

Cushing, the f i r s t American commissioner to

China, was instructed to impress China with America's new policy.
This new policy was a complete reversal of the submissive policy of
1784 which had been continued by the American merchants in China right
up to 1842 and the conclusion of the Opium War.

I t warned the

Chinese Government "that the United States could not remain in friendly
relations with China i f greater privileges were granted to any other
nationals than to the citizens of the United States."^

An assortment

o f Western s c ie n tific products were selected that hopefully would be
of interest to the emperor and his court.
The Treaty of Wanghia secured a ll the privileges fo r the
Americans that Great B ritain had wrung from China save the cessation
of the island of Hong Kong.
to the l i s t of demands:

The new treaty added two new features

a clause that stipulated further concessions

that were made to any one country would be shared by a ll and "extra
t e r r it o r ia lity " which granted the Powers jurisdiction over th e ir own
citizens while residing in China.
The Americans were now obtaining a bigger share of the
economic pie as a result of implied force and diplomacy.

I t should

not be overlooked that the United States and China had maintained a
working relationship with each other without the benefit of diplo
matic protection from 1784 to 1844.

The American Government's new

superior attitude in demanding a ll the privileges that Great Britain
had received from China as a result of force was a fa r cry from

^Dulles, op. c i t . , p. 25.
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America's humble f ir s t a rriv a l.
to believe:

I t no doubt caused the Chinese

"You make a ll same Englishmen too."1

The Manchu Government was convinced that the treaty system
forced upon China had been concluded.

Surely nothing more could

be added to the fin al treaty that would end a ll treaties.

A

number of scholarly Chinese o ffic ia ls did not agree with the
Emperor's conclusion.
signs offuture trouble.

They feared the early treaties were warning
As they were minority members of the court

l i t t l e attention was given to th e ir pessimistic analysis.

Time

has proven that the la te r Manchu rulers were not capable of sustain
ing the high level of a b ility displayed by the f ir s t three Manchu
leaders.

They avoided direct diplomatic contacts with the Western

Powers and did not take treaty guarantees seriously.
The treaty system was not rea lly established until
the British and French had secured treaties at
Tientsin in 1858. . . The new order was not
acknowledged until an Anglo-French expedition had
occupied Peking it s e lf in 1860. The transition
from tribute relations to treaty relations
occupied a generation of fric tio n at Canton before
1840, and twenty years of trade, negotiation, and
coercion thereafter. . . Although the new
treaties were signed as between equal sovereign
powers, they were actually quite unequal in that
China was placed against her w ill in a helpless
position.^
The in te rio r of China was opened for the Pov/ers afte r the
Treaty of Peking was signed in 1860.

International settlements,

foreign business and the missionary movements were then established

York:

^Dulles, op. c i t . , p. 5.
2
Fairbank, John King. The United States and China (New
The Viking Press, In c ., 1962), p. 120
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Western c iv iliz a tio n brought both benefits and drawbacks to China.
John King Fairbank in his splendid book The United States and China
cites:
The opium trade which supplied 10 or 15 percent
of the revenue of British India went hand in hand
with the Protestant missionary movement which was
nourished by the shillings and dimes of devout
congregations in the Christian West.
China's Reaction to Western Imperialism
Opium was only one of China's domestic problems resulting
from Western Imperialism; thousands of boatsmen and porters employed
by the inland transport system were unemployed a fte r China was
forced to open her additional ports; Chinese weavers and other crafts
men were ruined by the demand for cheaper articles produced in
Western industries; irrig a tio n neglect and produce damage during the
conflicts coupled with natural disasters of floods and droughts caused
intolerable conditions; t e r r if ic indemnities exacted forced unbearably
heavy taxes which were paid by small landowners, merchants and a r t i
sans.

Instead of s ilv e r paying for China's choice a rtic le s , the

Chinese had to use that precious metal for Western imports.

The

Manchus were blamed by the Chinese for th eir in a b ility to expel
the "foreign devils" and the gradual decay of th e ir country governed
by self-seeking, unqualified o ffic ia ls .
The bureaucracy did not seem to realize that the people
liv in g in the vast, powerful nation of China were seething with
frustration and ready for a rebellion.

The leader came in the

person of a young village schoolmaster. Hung Hsiu-ch'un, future
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head of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864).

Hung's so called Heavenly

Kingdom of Peace increased its numbers from the original twenty
thousand to over a m illion followers.

By 1853 the rebels had cap

tured Nanking where they established th e ir capital and ruled for
eleven years.

The Chinese World, an excellent informative book by

Richard Yang and Edward J. Lazzerini, lis ts a number of reasons for
the fa ilu re of the Taiping Rebellion:
. . .internal squabbles among the rebel leaders,
strategic blunders during la te r m ilita ry campaigns,
ideological fanaticism that alienated many possible
supporters (especially the e lite of China), dis
crepancies between the theory and practice of
Taiping l i f e , and the fa ilu re to take advantage
of early Western sympathy. . .
After the defeat of the Taipings in 1864, Anson Burlingame,
the United States envoy in China, endeavored to re-establish a
friendly relationship with the Manchu administration.
had China's interest at heart.

Burlingame

He believed as did Fen Kwei-fen,

a Chinese o f f ic ia l, in self-strengthening or positive thinking.
Feng's philosophy gave many people the courage to face the problems
th e ir country was experiencing, pick up the pieces le f t to them, and
learn Western culture.

By strengthening themselves they could

strengthen th e ir country.

Feng was a conservative that could not

quickly toss aside a system of government whose recorded history
began in 1154 B.C. with the Chou dynasty.

Its prehistoric date is

s t i l l unknown as archeologists to this day are unearthing well
w ritten inscribed stones that reveal names and events that are
associated with trad ition al folk tales and legends.
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Restoration Period

China was at peace a fte r the Taiping Rebellion had sub
sided.

The Confucian system was restored.

Although Confucius

founded no re lig io n , ordained no priests and conducted no religious
services, his teachings were v irtu a lly a religion to a large number
of Chinese people.

The Chinese home was considered to be a shrine,

the schools functioned as a church and the code of honor was for
the individual a gui.de of liv in g .

The highest p o litic a l offices

were opened to the best qualified students.
Feng's Restoration movement was twofold:
and self-improvement.

self-strengthening

Self-strengthening could be achieved by

improving China's in s titu tio n s , modernizing her army and navy.
Self-improvement included learning Western technology,
science and how to make greater use of China's economic resources
and human talen ts.

These improvements would strengthen the Confucian

system that should not be changed.
Lack of interest and in e rtia on the part of the Manchu
o ffic ia ls caused the fa ilu re of the reform movement.
Renewal of Western imperialism
As is always the case, an eccentric individual or group
w ill s ta rt a r io t or condition that w ill evolve into conflicts
and often wars.

In 1869-1870 an anti-Christian movement was

started that was followed by the Russian occupation in H i in
Sinkiang (1871), the Japanese attack on Formosa (1874), the B ritish
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demand to open Yunnan (1875), and the French invasion of Annam
(1884).

By 1894 China was not prepared m ilita r ily or fin ancially

to compete with the unannounced Japanese fle e t attack that ended
in a humiliating defeat fo r China.
These incidents resulted in the p artitio n of China by the
Powers.

The Chinese were not consulted by the imperialists in the

partitioning of China into "spheres of influence."
United States Secretary of State John Hay, with the assis
tance of Great B rita in , proclaimed the famous doctrine of the "Open
Door."

This doctrine called fo r an end to spheres of influence and

equal trade access throughout China.
Growth of Chinese nationalism
The Empress Dowager was more than w illin g to cooperate with
the reformers and cater to the

Powers when she and her court re

turned to Peking in 1901.
A series of edicts sim ilar to those suggested by K'ang
yu-wei in 1895 were adopted to

pacify the reformers.

In an e ffo rt

to re-establish a frien d ly relationship, the Empress assured the
Powers that the rebellion had been a purely domestic c o n flict.
Economically, the position of China continued to decline.
The Powers demanded an indemnity of almost 334 m illion dollars, a
fixed t a r i f f of fiv e percent and a permit to station troops in
Peking.

The United States remitted her allotment of the indemnity

to be used for educational purposes.

Chinese exports were greatly
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overshadowed by Western imports; heavy industry and railways were
backed by im perialist investors.
Since the overseas trade of China was primarily in the hands
of foreign banks and the bulk of the nation's resources were mortgaged
with im perialist companies, the future did not appear promising for
China and its people.
Students returning from foreign universities joined Chinese
intellectuals who were demanding a constitutional government that
would put an end to the incursions of foreign powers.
One Chinese patrio t who was greatly disturbed

by thede

grading condition of his country was Sun Yat-sen who had been a
revolutionary leader for twenty-four years.
Sun was born of a peasant family in 1866.

He attended a

l i t t l e village school near Canton un til he reached the age of four
teen.

Sun then joined his brother, a successful merchant-farmer

living in Hawaii.

While there he attended a mission school and

became a Christian.

His instructors encouraged him to continue his

education at the Hong Kong Medical College.
At the time Sun arrived at Hong Kong in the 1880s, the
island's harbor was f ille d with over a hundred ships and steamers
whose flags represented nations from a ll over the globe.

T a ll,

strong "sikhs" from India protected the people liv in g in the
beautiful c ity of Victoria.
being "anti-Chinese."

India's "sikhs" had the reputation of

The British in Hong Kong had reason to be

well fo rtifie d a fte r demanding China's island in 1842, in exchange
for the unauthorized opium destroyed by the Chinese government
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o ffic ia ls .
As Sun watched Chinese coolies trudging up the terraced
mountainside carrying long poles on th e ir shoulders that were
attached to a canvas-covered chair upon which was seated a
foreigner, he was quoted as mumbling, "I am a coolie and the son
of a coolie."
In his Lecture on China John L. Stoddard paints a vivid
word picture of China's unskilled coolies that enables the reader
to understand the Revolutionary Movement in China.

Taking a trip

on an American steamer from Hong Kong to Canton he went down to
the deck below and
found a number of Chinamen—most of them were
smoking, lying on th e ir backs, th e ir heads
supported by a bale of cloth. . . farther down,
packed in the hold like sardines in a box and
barricaded from us by an iron grating were more
than 1000 Chinese coolies. A sentry heavily
armed, stood by the padlocked grating. . J
During his college years in Hong Kong, Sun Yat-sen was
fortunate in studying under an excellent professor, Sir James
Cantile, who became an understanding friend.
Western missionaries and educators favored the reform
movement in China.

Sun was inspired by th e ir ideals and institu tio ns.

He agreed with th e ir ideas that the ethical training of the Confucian
system should be supplemented with s c ie n tific knowledge.

He did not

allow his b itte r feelings to interfere with friendships that he had

^Stoddard, John L. John L. Stoddard's Lectures Vol. I l l
(Chicago: George L. Shuman and Co., 1897), pp. 259-260.
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with certain foreigners.
After receiving his degree in medicine, Dr. Sun Yat-sen began
his career in Macao.

Within a short time, he was informed that a

Portuguese degree in medicine was required.

His response was to

abandon his medical career and become an active revolutionary.
Sun's experiences convinced him that only the overthrow of the
empire and establishment of a republic could save what was l e f t of
the once powerful nation of China.
Sun Yat-sen was determined to do everything possible to
unseat the in e ffic ie n t, corrupt Manchu government that had been
responsible for the deterioration of c itie s lik e Canton.
had been the proud, intellectu al center of China.

The c ity

Wealthy land

owners whose tea and s ilk were in demand provided good schools and
selected talented teachers.

The c iv il service examination sheds

were s t i l l standing that had been erected on sixteen acres of
ground.

Before the Manchu dynasty had become corrupt, no favor

itism or cheating was allowed.
Canton in the late nineteenth century was a far cry from
Hong Kong.

Dirt-crusted, dilapidated buildings were s t i l l standing

along the f ilt h y , crowded streets, swarming with half clad in d i
viduals.

Opium dens and fortune te lle rs could be seen everywhere.

People were trying to forget the horrible condition of th e ir country
by seeking a ray of hope for the future.

Hatred could be seen on

the faces of the Chinese of a ll ages as they stared with contempt
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at foreigners.
In preference to turning to opium or fortune te lle r s ,
Sun contacted leaders of the Triad Secret Society, one of the many
anti-Manchu groups.
Before the Boxer Rebellion Sun in 1894 had organized his
f ir s t secret society, the Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society).
By 1895 he had become a recognized revolutionary leader.
At this early date he appears to have met and
received help from a Shanghai merchant, Charles
Jones Soong, who had lived in the United States
as a child, become a baptized Methodist, and
studied theology three years at Vanderbilt
University before returning to China. (His
daughters married Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek
and H. H. Kung, respectively. Their brother
was T. V. Soong.)*
In 1895 Sun Yat-sen's f ir s t revolutionary attempt fa ile d .
His secret society had planned to seize the Canton provincial
government offices.

From this point onwards Dr. Sun was forced to

liv e in exile as there was a price on his head by the Manchu
government.

Disguised he traveled to Japan, the United States,

Europe and Southeast Asia to raise money from overseas Chinese for
his secret societies.
Although Sun was not livin g in China, he was studying
p o litic a l and social theories and constantly trying to improve
his revolutionary programs,
In 1905 his completed Revolutionary League was introduced

Vairbank, op. c i t . , p. 151
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which formed the dogma of the Kuomintang (National People's Party).
I t consisted of the Three People's Principles:

Nationalism—freeing

a ll China from foreign control; Democracy—overthrowing the Manchu
dynasty and replacing i t with a democratic p o litic a l system and
People's Livelihood—equalization of land.
After fifte e n years of plotting and planning a revolution
that would overthrow the weak, corrupt Manchu dynasty, Dr. Sun
Yat-sen, founder of the revolutionary movement, was not even in
China when the outbreak of the fin al successful revolt occurred.
He was in the United States at that time on a fund raising tour for
his revolutionary party.

The details were soon flashed throughout

the world by the news media:
On the evening of October 10, 1911, an explo
sion occurred in a house in the Russian conces
sion at Han-K'ou. . . The police investigated
and found that the house was a revolutionary
headquarters and an arsenal where grenades were
being made. They also found a l i s t of the members
of an ille g a l revolutionary party. This l i s t
contained the names of many army officers
stationed nearbyJ
The secret revolutionary society was not id e n tifie d .

This "double

ten" uprising (tenth day of the tenth month) has since been celebrated
as the birthday of the Chinese Republic.

Sun then returned to China

in triumph.
January 1, 1912 Dr. Sun Yat-sen had the honor of being
inaugurated Provisional President of the Republic of China.

He soon

discovered, however, that he had a rival fo r his newly acquired

^Fitzgerald, op. c i t . , pp. 364-365.
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o ffic e .

Yuan S h ih-k'ai, the warlord who had betrayed the young

emperor, Kwang-hsu, established himself as head of the Chinese
government a fte r the death of the Empress Dowager.
Fearing a c iv il war and more partitioning of the nation,
Sun Yat-sen resigned his presidency of the Republic of China in
exchange for Yuan's agreement that as President he would liv e and
govern China from the new capital c ity of Nanking; commit himself
to following the constitutional system of government and observe
Sun's "Three Principles of the People."
After receiving Yuan's pledge to abide by the demands,
Dr. Sun Yat-sen resigned his presidency February 13, 1912.
Henry Pu Y i, at the age of s ix , abdicated the throne,
thus ending the Chinese dynastic system.

In the decree issued in

the young emperor's name Yuan Shi-k'ai was appointed to organize a
republic.

On February 14, 1912 Yuan was elected Provisional

President by the council of Nanking,
Japan.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen departed for

Yuan became a m ilitary dictator.

The following year China

joined the Western Powers fighting Germany.
Chinese were sent to the Western Front.

A large number of

The new leader did not

keep any of his promises and fin a lly dissolved Sun's p o litic a l party.
Against the opposition of the Kuomintang and without th e ir
knowledge Yuan negotiated a large "reorganization loan" from France,
Russia, Great B rita in , Germany and Japan.

With the protection of

the army and the recognition of the Powers, there seemed to be
nothing to fear.

Japan joined the alliance against Germany for the

express purpose of acquiring Germany's te r r ito r ia l possessions in
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Chi na.
China was alarmed and turned to the United States for
assistance. Yuan urged President Woodrow Wilson to make i t clear
to a ll nations concerned to refrain from h o s tilitie s on China's
te rrito ry .

Japan not only fought on China's soil but took over

Germany's concessions as w ell.

By joining the A llies Japan secured

valuable bases needed for her products and raw materials.
In January 1915, a fte r China had been practically reduced
to a semi-colonial status, Kato, the Prime Minister of Japan, pre
sented Yuan with a paper that listed twenty-one insulting demands.
The l i s t included such items as:

control of the Manchurian railways

and ports by the Japanese; jo in t Sino-Japanese control over China's
iron and steel works, arsenals and mines; and Japanese advisers in
fin a n c ia l, m ilita ry and p o litic a l a ffa irs .
Protests against the Demands could be heard throughout
the nation from a ll classes of people.

Although his inflated ego

had been dealt a serious blow, Yuan announced his intention of
founding a new dynasty and that his reign as f ir s t emperor would
take place at that time.

The storm of opposition was so intense

that the future emperor gave up his goal, retired from p o litic a l
l i f e and died within a short time.
The Warlord

period

The government of the Republic of China was f ir s t taken
over by the Vice President, Lu Yuan-hung who lacked real authority.
Within a year the central authority had disappeared and the Chinese
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state had practically collapsed.

Northern warlords with th e ir

personal coolie armies struggled for sumpremacy.

Southern revolu

tionaries trie d to restore the constitutional republic.

The puppet

government in Peking installed by the warlord in power at the time,
was accepted by other nations as the legitimate government in China.
During the warlord era between 1917 to 1928 the Chinese
experienced a cultural awakening.

The Powers were so involved in

World War I that th e ir industries and commerce were neglected
temporarily.

China took advantage of th e ir loss by rapidly develop

ing new industries in old and new c itie s .
Employment opportunities opened for a large number of
peasants, men, women, and children a lik e .

Family l i f e changed as the

majority of the rural population had worked, lived and remained in
the same location during th e ir life tim e .

With a ll of its disadvan

tages including long hours and low wages, i t was a broadening experi
ence to become id en tified as one of a group of people that give
allegiance to movements such as strikes, nationalism and Communism.
When America's l i t t l e trading vessel, the Empress of China,
anchored at Whampoa Island, China's only trading port open to fo r
eigners in 1784, the hong merchants who dealt with them were classified
in China as third class citizen s.
While conducting th e ir business a ffa irs the foreigners were
restricted to the island which gave China's merchants an opportunity
to observe and study Western business techniques that included specu
lation and manipulation.

By the twentieth century many of these

Chinese merchants had come to represent a wealthy, conservative sector
of society.

Their children were sent overseas to acquire a thorough
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Western education in hopes that the younger generation could revive
and unify th e ir nation again.

In transacting business at the d iffe r 

ent trading ports, the hong merchants became aware of the p a trio tic
national loyalty foreigners seemed to feel for th e ir individual
nations.

After the Japanese presented the infamous Twenty-one Demands,

the f i r s t great student migration occurred at that time.

Next to

Japan, the largest number of students went to the United States as
many took advantage of the United States Boxer indemnity that was
returned to China for the promotion of education.
Dr. Hu Shih, aprofessor at Peking University who had
formerly

been a student who had studied in the United States, in tro 

duced the w ritten form of the everyday vernacular Chinese speech.
Literate Chinese could then read and study material w ritten by
philosophers including Marx, Kant, Nietzshe, and Dewey which was
printed in books, magazines and newspapers.
Another, then unknown, future leader of China, was Mao
Tse-tung who was associated with the Peita Library as an assistant
lib ra ria n .
China was handicapped at the Paris Conference held in May
1919, as she was represented by two governments, Peking and Canton.
Regardless of th e ir divided internal p o litic a l differences, the
two governments had the same foreign policy.

The two representatives

called fo r China's release from the unequal treaties forced upon her
and the return of te rrito rie s especially the German concession that
was unlawfully seized by the Japanese during World War I .

Both

speakers asked for China's rig ht to manage its own economy and exert
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control over foreign enterprise and to end the humiliating experi
ence whereby China was considered an equal nation.
I f China's delegates had hoped fo r the return of the German
concessions, they soon learned that th e ir request was impossible as
Lloyd George and Clemenceau and the rest of the A llie s had signed
a secret pact with Yuan's Peking government agreeing to give a ll
German possessions to Japan.

President Wilson was firm ly convinced

that the League of Nations was the only way to keep the world united
and, Japan threatened to resign from the international organization
i f her demands were not granted.
China considered herself to be one of the A llies and conse
quently that she deserved recognition and the privilege of p a rtic i
pation in the League of Nations policy making.

When the shocking

news flashes revealed the A llied d u p licity, the "National Humiliation"
(Twenty-one Demands Day) was advanced to May 4, 1919.
P o litic a l parties and secret organizations in China benefited
from the s p ir it of activism.

Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist Party, the

Kuomintang, was rev ita lized by hundreds of new members.
Sun's request for recognition and aid was refused at the
Washington Conference (1921-22).

He was informed that the Western

nations recognized the Peking regime as China's legal government.
The turbulent condition in the nation made i t necessary to
completely reorganize the Kuomintang.

In 1921 two Chinese Communist

branches were organized, one in Paris which included Chou En-lai as
a member and the other in China which had a small membership.

Mao

Tse-tung was lis te d as one of the thirteen charter members of the
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China branch.

Additional funds were needed to maintain the Kuomintang.

In 1923 Sun decided to turn to the Soviet Union fo r assistance
as i t seemed to be his last resort.

He agreed a fte r a period of

negotiations to cooperate in organizing a United Front with the Chinese
Communist Party.

The Soviets in turn agreed to give financial backing

and provide p o litic a l and m ilitary advisers to the Kuomintang.

In

making the agreement Sun insisted that new Communist members would
clearly understand that they were joining the Nationalist Kuomintang
Party as individuals not as a bloc.
Under the counsel of the Soviets the concepts of a n ticapitalism and anti-imperialism were stressed.

This caused a great

deal of dissension among the wealthy business segment of the
Kuomintang.
Before Sun's death in 1925, the United Front was well estab
lished in Canton, and the Whampoa M ilita ry Academy was organized
with Chiang Kai-shek as its m ilitary commandant.

Sun became a

national hero a fte r his death in 1925.
Chiang Kai-shek, a loyal follower of Sun Yat-sen, was well
prepared to command the "Northern Expedition" in 1926.

At the age

of nineteen he had entered China's f ir s t m ilitary academy located
at Paoting near Peking.

The following year he went to Japan where

he spent four years as a student in the Imperial College at Tokyo.
In addition to m ilita ry tactics his favorite subjects included law,
the Confucian classics and the writings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
Chiang's m ilita ry career began in 1923 at which time he
was sent by Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Moscow for further revolutionary
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training.

While there Chiang was impressed with the propaganda

tactics that could enable a small group of people to sway, manipulate
and persuade thousands of people to follow th e ir ideas of government,
much the same as secret societies and religious cults.

Being a devout

N ationalist, Chiang listened to and observed every detail suggested.
The Boxer Rebellion, China's f ir s t significant national outbreak that
brought not only humiliation but despair to the Chinese people, was
s t i l l fresh in Chiang's mind.

He was determined to be one of the

"twenty m illion Boxers," that British o f f ic ia l, S ir Robert Hart pre
dicted "would terminate the unequal treaties and repay China's
humiliations with interest."^
At the time the Northern Expedition was launched Chiang
was ju st

as determined in ridding the country of "foreign devils"

and spineless Peking warlords who had betrayed China as were other
loyal members of the Kuomintang including Communists such as Chou
E n -lai, Lin Piao, Mao Tse-tung and Wang Ching-wei.

Conservatives

and Communists alike were a ll fighting for the same cause.
After Sun's death, Communist a c tiv ity among the workers and
peasants, however, had been increasing so rapidly that conservative
elements of the Kuomintang with which Chiang was iden tified were...
alarmed.

Chiang, as Commander of the Northern Expedition, clamped

down controls on the Communists.
Before reaching Shanghai, Chiang was informed that the Left
wing of the Kuomintang had established headquarters a t Hankow and

^Yang, op. c i t . , p. 41.
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that Chou En-lai was on his way to Shanghai to s ta rt a rebellion
which would involve wealthy supporters of the N ationalist Kuomingtang
wing.

Chiang's troops were immediately ordered to turn vio len tly on

th e ir former Communist a llie s .

Chou was one of the few Communist

members to escape.
United States' National Interest in China
during the 1930s and 1940s
After Chiang Kai-shek's troops swept into Peking, a ll war
lords save one, Chang Tso-Lin, had been eliminated!

Japan as well

as the Peking warlord had reason to be concerned since Japan's
Manchurian areas north of the Great Wall were in danger.

Her c iv il

and m ilita ry leaders had possibly waited too long to take that valu
able province whose rich agricultural soil plus raw materials in
cluding iron, coal and timber were desperately needed.

I t was impor

tant that immediate action be taken due to Japan's population pres
sures and the fact that one h a lf of Tokyo's foreign investments were
in Manchuria.
September 18, 1931, i t was reported that the missing war
lord was on his way to Manchuria ". . .a s Chang's train approached
Mukden the train was blown up by a bomb and Chang was k illed ."^

The

Japanese were quick to place the blame on the Chinese who denied the
accusation.

The "Mukden Incident" provided an excuse fo r Japan to

sta rt a successful invasion of Manchuria.

Within a short time the

Nationalists were driven south of the Wall, and Japan was in fu ll

^Fitzgerald, op. c i t . , p. 372.
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control of Manchuria.
In May 1945 the War in Europe came to an end.

The A llies

then gave fu ll attention and aid to problems in East Asia.

The

United States Airforce repaid Japan's Pearl Harbor bombing by
dropping the f ir s t atom bombs on two of her c itie s , Hiroshema and
Nagasaki.

Japan then surrendered.
In 1945 Chiang Kai-shek had the honor of representing

N ationalist China a t the charter meeting of the United Nations.
He was the f ir s t member of the fifty -o n e nations to sign the United
Nations Charter.
Japan's surrender did not end China's problems.

When the

fin a l settlement was announced both Nationalist and Communist leaders
were present.
Kai-shek.

The Japanese were ordered to surrender only to Chiang

American planes and ships assisted Chiang in transferring

his troops.

At that time he made the natural decision of protecting

the large c itie s .

Mao did not object as he preferred to place his

troops in rural d is tric ts .
Mao and Chiang had many differences to solve that eventually
led to a c iv il war.

To prevent that from happening, President Harry

Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China as a mediator.

The

Conference called for a m ilitary truce, but i t proved to be a fa ilu re .
M ilita ry clashes began and continued until 1949 when Chiang resigned.
A negotiated settlement was refused.

In 1949, accompanied by his

fam ily, most of his government o ffic ia ls , some 50,000 troops and
two and one half m illion c iv ilia n s , Chiang withdrew to the island
of Taiwan.
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P e k in g 's P ro -S o v ie t P o lic y

In Peking's Tien-an-men Square on October 1, 1949, Mao
Tse-tung proudly proclaimed the People's Republic of China.
Mao waited until December 1949 to pay his respects to
Russia's powerful Joseph Stalin and at the same time make economic
requests for the new Communist Republic.

After nine weeks of per

severance an agreement that was to run fo r th irty years was signed
by Mao and S talin .

.

United States' China Policy a fte r the Communist Takeover
The People's Republic came to iden tify the United States
as its chief im perialist enemy.

President Harry Truman's policy

was one of neu trality that he announced January 5, 1950:
. . . that the U.S. would not accord m ilitary
aid to the N ationalist, that i t had no predatory
design on Formosa or any other Chinese te rrito ry ,
and that i t had no desire to obtain special rights
or privileges or to establish m ilita ry bases on
the is la n d .'

\a to u r e tte , op. c i t . , pp. 704-705.
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CHAPTER I I

CONTAINMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA
Background of Containment
September 12, 1940, United States Ambassador to Japan
Joseph C. Grew reported that Japanese m ilita ris ts were planning
an aggressive program of expansion in the Far East.

He advised the

United States government to take a firm policy to maintain the status
quo until the ending of the European War.

England would then be free

to assist China and the United States in curbing Japanese aggression
in China.
To prevent the United States from interfering with her plans
for expansion in Asia, Japan aligned herself with the Axis powers
fighting in Europe who would be obliged to come to her aid.
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the following year,
Great B ritain and China declared war against Japan and became a llie s
with the United States.

The European and Asian wars then merged

into a global con flict known as World War I I .
The United States and her a llie s had two major objectives
in the war of the Pacific:

to subdue Japan and restore China to her

status as a great powerful nation.

Following, th e ir historic meeting

aboard a ship in the mid-Atlantic in August, 1941, President Franklin
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued a jo in t
36
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declaration en title d the A tlantic Charter.

The declaration "pro

claimed the principles that were to guide the two countries in th e ir
search for a ju s t peace and a stable world.
The Atlantic Charter was accepted and signed by twenty-six
nations at a meeting of the United Nations held in Washington, D.C.
January 1, 1942.

The signers pledged

to employ in close cooperation th e ir fu ll m ilitary
and economic resources against those members of the
Axis with which they were at war, and to make no
separate peace or armistice with th e ir enemies. . .
There was to be no peace with Japan un til she had
been driven out of the conquered te rrito ry in China
and southeastern Asia, and her m ilita ry government
had been wholly defeated by force of arms.
January 11, 1943, the f i r s t steps by Great Britain and the
United States were taken to restore China's rig h tfu l place in the
world.

A treaty was signed by the Western powers that not only

restored freedom and independence to China but gave her a ray of
hope a fte r a century of humiliation and privation.

The treaty re

leased the Middle Kingdom from the Unequal Treaties that had denied
the Chinese government the privilege of p o litic a l control over th e ir
nation.

In addition to renouncing the e x tra te rrito ria l rights and

agreeing to the removal of her troops and gunboats from Chinese
riv e rs , the United States
repealed Chinese exclusion laws, established an
annual Chinese quota, and made i t possible for
legally admitted Chinese to become American

^01 ton, Roy and Plano, Jack C. The International Relations
Dictionary Second Edition (Kalamazoo, Michigan: New Issues Press,
1979), p. 8.
2
Dulles, Foster Rhea. China and America (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 2.
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citizens. . .The United States also awarded China
one of the fiv e permanent seats in the United
Nations Security Council.'
In 1943 President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek met in Cairo at which time they issued
an o ffic ia l bu lletin demanding the return of a ll te rrito rie s that
Japan had taken from China including Formosa, the Pescadores,
Manchuria, Korea and a number of islands.
Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met once again near the
end of the European War, this time at the Livadia Palace near Yalta
in the Crimea.
. . .February 4 to 11, 1945, the Big Three, a fte r
considerable compromise, made important decisions
. . . To la te r c r itic s , Yalta symbolizes a " s e ll
out" to—or appeasement of—the Soviets, an example
of Roosevelt's coddling of the Communist menace. . .
Although at Yalta Hiss was an adviser on questions
of international organization, no evidence exists
that he influenced Roosevelt or the results of the
conference. . .2
At that time Roosevelt and Churchill secretly agreed to
give the Soviet Union control over Outer Mongolia and Manchuria pro
viding the Soviets v/ould enter the war against Japan.
After the collapse of Germany in 1945, war was waged against
Japan from a ll directions.

The Japanese were driven out of Burma,

and land transportation was re-opened between China and India.

On

^Spanier, John W. American Foreign Policy Since World War
I I (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 75.
^C liffo rd , J. Garry, Hagan, Kenneth J ., and Paterson, Thomas
G. American Foreign Policy A History (Lexington: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1977), p. 409.
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August 6, 1945 an atom bomb was dropped by the United States Air
Force on the Japanese c ity of Hiroshima; two days la te r a second
bomb f e ll on the c ity of Nagasaki.
The Soviet Union then carried out her part of the secret Yalta
agreement by entering the Pacific war.
her troops into Manchuria.

She followed suit by sending

On August 9, 1945 Japan fin a lly surrendered,

and almost immediately, the Soviets took over Manchuria from the
Japanese.

The Chinese people were startled to learn that the Soviets

dismantled many of th e ir Manchurian industries and shipped them to
Russia.

Fortunately, the Soviets did manage to give some Japanese

weapons and ammunition to the Chinese Communists.
The Yalta "betrayal" is only one of the tragic results of
the Big Three Meeting.^
China did not confirm the Yalta agreement until August 1945.
The delay could be easily understood.
Russia had continuing rights in the region: the
railways were to be operated jo in tly by Russia and
China, Port Arthur was to be a jo in t naval base for
the two powers, and Darien, the chief port, was to
be open to a ll nations. The Russians, in possession
of Darien, placed obstacles in the way of opening
the port. President Roosevelt had long f e lt that
Russia was en title d to an ice-free port, and that this
could best be had through Manchuria.2
In return, the authors of the agreement suggested that the
Soviet Union fu lly recognize Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and
pledge i t s e lf not to in terfere in China's internal a ffa irs and declare

^Spanier, Op. c i t . , pp. 82-83.
2

Latourette, Kenneth Scott. A Short History of the Far East
(New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 690-691.
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that whatever support or material assistance i t gave China i t would
be "given fu lly to the National government as the central government
of China."1
The Japanese surrendered, but the co n flict between the
Nationalists and Chinese Communists intensified.

Both parties en

deavored to strengthen th e ir p o litic a l and m ilitary positions by
seizing Japanese weapons and ammunition l e f t at the time of the
Japanese hasty departure.

The Nationalists had the advantage in

th e ir competition with the Communists as the Japanese received orders
to surrender only to Chiang Kai-shek.

American ships and planes

were stationed at Peking and Tientsin, not only to guard what was
l e f t by the Soviets but to be ready to transport Nationalist troops
and government o ffic ia ls .
Ambassador Hurley urged Chiang Kai-shek to send invitations
to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai to come to Chungking for a negotia
tion meeting.

He personally flew to the Communist headquarters at

Yenan with the approval of Chiang to establish friendly relations.
By early October 1945, the parties had reached what could at least
be described as "an agreement to agree."

Nationalists and Communists

promised to submit th e ir differences to a P o litic al Consultative
Council under the chairmanship of Chiang Kai-shek.

Both Nationalist

and Communist leaders reiterated th e ir desire to avoid c iv il s tr ife .
On September 3 Chiang had expressed his intentions of

t u l l e s , op. c i t . , p. 252.
2
Dulles, op. c i t . , p. 253.
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in s titu tin g the domestic reforms suggested by the United States:
a democratic government planned by Sun Yat-sen; economic reforms
relating to "People's Livelihood" and industries.

China would have

been saved from the tragedy of a c iv il war i f Chiang had carried out
these reforms.
Having been born into a high grade gentry fam ily, Chiang
surely was aware of the fact that the peasant people, which numbered
ninety percent of China's population, were required to bear the
burden of higher taxes and enormous interest rates.

As head of the

Nationalist Party, Chiang turned to the wealthy in d u s tria lis ts,
bankers, money lenders, landlords and merchants fo r financial assis
tance.

Many of them, as in the United States today, flaunted their

luxuries before the rest of the populace.
m ilita ry conscription.^

Their sons often avoided

Corruption, inefficiency and nepotism were

tolerated among high as well as low government o ffic ia ls .

Chiang's

government completely lost popularity when "prices doubled sixtyseven times in the two and a half years from early 1946 to late
1948."

o

This unchecked in fla tio n was in large measure due to the

lack of budget control on the part of the government.

This situation

led to increased crime and corruption and resulted in a police state.
"Professors were often dismissed, even arrested when they began to
c ritic iz e the government for its policies.
inclined were also thrown into j a i l . "

Students sim ilarly

3

^Spanier, op. c i t . , pp. 78-79.
2

3

Spanier, op. c i t . , pp. 79-80.
Spanier, op. c i t . , p. 80.
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Service and Davies under pressure
John S. Service and John Paton Davies, United States Foreign
Officers stationed in China during World War I I and the beginning of
the Chinese c iv il war, expressed criticism of the Chiang Kai-shek
regime.

Service and Davies prophecied that i t would not be d i f f i 

c u lt for Mao to defeat Chiang in a c iv il war.

Service had been

p o litic a l advisor to General S tilw ell before the la tte r's r e lie f from
the China command in October 1944.

Ambassador Hurley did not

approve of Service's reports to S tilw ell and followed through by
denouncing the Foreign Service O fficer.

A Senate investigation

followed which revealed no treason on Service's part.

In October

1944 Service commented that the Communist revolutionary leadership
has improved the p o litic a l, economic and social
status of the peasant. . . As the Japanese cannot
defeat these forces of the people, neither can the
Kuomintang. . . The Communists are certain to
play a large, i f not dominant, part in China's
fu tu re .'
In Chungking Chiang persisted with his proposal on the merger
of the Nationalist and Communist armies without a real coalition.
Hurley continued backing Chiang.

The Amabassador came to view his

China assignment as one to support Chiang and the Nationalist govern
ment not one to mediate the dispute.

He believed that the Communists

would eventually agree to his terms.

An e a rlie r v is it, to Moscow in

August 1944 had convinced him of this line of reasoning.

At that

time Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had remarked that the Chinese

D. C.:

^Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944 (Washington:
Government Printing O ffice, 1967), V i, pp. 631-632.
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Communists "had no relation whatever to Communism" and that the
Russians would back Chiang Kai-shekJ
There were a number of other Americans in China which in 
cluded representatives of the Army, Office of Strategic Services,
and Treasury as well as Foreign Service Officers who were convinced
that Mao's followers were agrarian based Communists.

They reasoned

that i f the United States denied Mao assistance that he would seek
aid from Moscow.

This situation would undoubtedly develop into a

strong Soviet-American point of contention.

Many of the Foreign

Service Officers maintained that the only way to bring about an
agreement was to deal with Yenan on an individual basis; this situa
tion would then put more pressure on Chiang.

Despite the deteriora

ting Chinese state of events, Hurley disregarded his s ta ff's advice.
When the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations reached an impasse, he
accused the Foreign Service Officers of sabotaging his position by
encouraging the Communists.

He was also able to block any meeting

between Mao and Roosevelt.
In February 1945 the fin al break between Hurley and the
Foreign Service Officers took place.

At this time Hurley returned

to Washington for meetings with Roosevelt.

Another crucial element

in this whole a ffa ir was that the Foreign Service O fficers, along
with Chiang Kai-shek himself, had not yet been informed that at
Yalta Stalin had agreed to Russian entry into the Japanese war.
During Hurley's stay in Washington the embassy officers at Chungking

^Buhite, Russell D. Patrick J. Hurley and American Policy
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 152.
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sent a telegram to Washington urging Roosevelt to
inform Chiang Kai-shek in defin ite terms that we
are required by m ilita ry necessity to cooperate
with and supply the Communists and other suitable
groups who can aid in this war against the
Japanese.'
Hurley was outraged when he read this telegram; as a result he
accused his s ta ff of undermining his effo rts .in China.

The

Ambassador asserted that he would obtain an agreement between Mao
and Chiang by A p ril.

Roosevelt, who was a dying man, gave Hurley

strong support for the Kuomintang.

The United States State Depart

ment was forced to give in to the Ambassador; the majority of the
embassy s ta ff including Service and Davies were soon transferred
out o f China.
Ambassador Hurley abruptly resigned on November 27, 1945 and
charged that the career o ffic ia ls had

sabotaged his policy by

deserting the Nationalists and siding with the Communists.

He de

clared, "A considerable section of our State Department is endeavoring
to support Communism generally as well as s p ecifically in China."
In December 1945 President Harry Truman sent General George
C. Marshall on the next "Mission to China."

In January 1946 the

General ordered a cease-fire in hopes of establishing a coalition
government.

Chiang was determined to drive a ll Soviet and Chinese

Communists from Manchuria.

In April General Marshall's cease-fire

order came to an abrupt bloody end.

General Marshall then resigned.

V e is , Herbert. The China Tangle: The American E ffort in
China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 269.
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President Truman then turned to General Albert C. Wedemeyer
fo r assistance.

The "Wedemeyer Mission" reached China in July 1947.

General Wedemeyer was convinced that the party leaders, Mao and
Chiang, were too fa r.ap art to be interested in a coalition govern
ment.

Communism was an obsession to Chiang Kai-shek.

Aside from

his m ilita ry training Chiang was deeply read not only with the
Confucian Classics, but law, history and Sun Yat-sen's textbook and
writings.

He was a revolutionist, but lik e Sun Yat-sen, not a

Communist. He had studied the Soviet system in great depth.
John G. Stoessinger in his excellent book Nations in
Darkness:

China, Russia and America comments:
. . .there is strong evidence that the origins of
the Kuomintang and the Communist party in China
were almost the same. Both were conceived in the
anti-Western reaction that swept China in the early
1920‘ s.

The author explains
Chiang Kai'shek's p o litic a l model for the Kuomintang
came not from the democratic West but from China's
Confucian past. . . he (Chiang) urged the officers
of the Kuomintang to delve into the classics. . .he
declared Confucius' birthday a national holiday. . .
In 1934 Chiang decreed the canonization of Confucius,
and the Confucian temple at Kufow became a national
shrine.
In his book China's Destiny Chiang Kai'shek in no uncertain
terms gave the reasons for China's decay and the horrible conditions
he inherited upon his assertion of power in 1928.

He declared, "The

national decay during the la st hundred years reached a point unequalled
in our history."
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United States China policy during World War I I demonstrated
a lack of balance between m ilita ry strategy and postwar p o litic a l
goals.

By 1944 i t was apparent that China would not be a major

participant in the Japanese theatre.

At this time she did not have

the large degree of economic, p o litic a l and m ilitary power of the
United States, the Soviet Union and Great B ritain.

During the war

Roosevelt had several policy choices that he could have implemented
regarding China.

The f ir s t was to increase American m ilita ry assis

tance and urge Chiang to carry out the reforms necessary to remain
in power.

The second alternative was to lim it his p o litic a l expec-

tations for China and reduce United States m ilitary a c tiv ity in the
area.

Unfortunately the President attempted to pursue both approaches

a t the same time.

He continued dealing with China as i f she had

great power status while giving more attention to other c ritic a l
areas of the globe.

Roosevelt had followed existing China policy

during the clash between Hurley and the China hands.
Why the United States did not recognize the
government of the People's Republic of China
In June 1949 Mao Tse-tung stated that he was "leaning to
one side."

He had chosen the path of socialism in preference to

imperialism.^

American policy makers should not have been shocked

because United States China policy had been directed against the
Communists since 1945.

Mao Tse-tung severely denounced American

^Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1971), p. 199.
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intervention in Chinese a ffa irs while Americans in turn believed
that China had become a clie n t state of the Soviet Union.

According

to the Cold War mentality Moscow directed a ll Communist movements
throughout the world.

Yet Marshall had maintained that he could find

no concrete proof of Soviet intervention in China.
In August 1949 Secretary of State Dean Acheson (who replaced
Marshall in January) issued the China White Paper which began with
"the Communist regime serves not (Chinese) interests but those of
Soviet Russia."^
The White Paper illu s tra te s that there was l i t t l e more that
the United States could have done to bolster up the Nationalist
government as Chiang refused to implement v ita l domestic reforms.
In December 1949 Chiang le f t the Chinese mainland with the
treasury to Taiwan.

The Peoples Republic of China was formally

established on October 1, 1949.
Who lost China?
Henry R. Luce, publisher of Time Magazine, along with
Republican congressmen and missionaries formed a group known as the
China Lobby.

They accused President Truman of "losing" China.

Senator Styles Bridges and Congressmen Walter Judd led the influen tial
China Lobby.

This group supported American m ilita ry involvement in

the Chinese Civil War.
They argued:

^United States Department of State. United States Relations
with China (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1949), p. x v ii.
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I f the essence of American foreign policy was the
containment of conrninism without geographical lim it,
as stated in the Truman Doctrine and the "X"
a r tic le , why did not the United States intervene
in China? I f Greece, why not China?^
Truman and his advisors never re a lly gave a specific response
to the preceding question.

Their arguments included the ideas that

China was too large, that a land war in Asia was out of the question,
that Chiang, unlike the Greek government was unmanageable, that the
Greek question was an immediate c ris is , that there was no evidence of
foreign influence in China, and that the costs were out of reach.

The

Truman Administration continued to uphold its containment doctrine and
pointed out that i t had done its best to prevent Communism from taking
over in China.

The c ritic s did not agree with the Administration's

assessment of the China situation.
Why the United States fa ile d in China
United States' fa ilu re was not due to in s u ffic ien t aid to
the Nationalist government or a lack of concern.

The main reason

for the United States' defeat in this area of the globe was the
fact that American leaders did not realize the power and force of
a peasant society that was ripe for a change and the attractiveness
that the Communist reform program had among the war weary Chinese
people.

Unfortunately, the United States did not summon up the

courage to admit that supporting the Nationalist government was a
policy mistake.

LPaterson, op. c i t . , p. 462.
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United States China Policy a fte r the Communist Takeover
The United States would not recognize the People's Republic
of China a fte r Mao's victory over Chiang for a number of reasons.
Sino-American mutual h o s tility continued to increase.
In June of 1949 the leading elements of the Chinese Communist
Party asked American Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart to meet with them
to work out a compromise agreement.

The Truman Administration refused

such a meeting because of the strong opposition from the pro-Chiang
"China Lobby."

The Communists continued to remind Americans of th e ir

im p erialist past including m ilita ry participation in the Boxer
Rebellion, support fo r Japan's seizure of Shantung in 1919, and naval
gunboat patrols on Chinese rivers in the 1920s and 1930s.

They

seized American property and attacked United States citizens.
American Consul General at Mukden Angus Ward was held under house
arrest from November 1947 to October 1949 at which time he was
formally tr ie d , convicted of spying and expelled from China.
Mao's Pro Soviet Policy
From December 1949 through February 1950 Mao remained in
Moscow and negotiated with the Soviets a treaty of friendship and
alliance.

Mao's main concerns were Japan and the American presence

in Asia.
The United States perceived that this Si no-Soviet agreement
proved that communism was a monolith.

The treaty included such

items as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur, the
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withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur, the transfer of Soviet
interests in railroads to China, Soviet commercial rights in Sinkiang,
and recognition of Russian control of Outer Mongolia.
China very l i t t l e aid.
Russia:

Russia gave

According to 0. Edmund Clubb in China and

the Great Game, the Soviet credit to China had narrow lim its:
I t provided for a Soviet credit of U.S. $300
m illio n , expendable in equal portions of one
f if t h annually over a period of fiv e years from
January 1, 1950, and repayable with 1 percent
interest in ten annual installments beginning
"not la te r than" December 31, 1954, and ending
December 31, 1963. The credits would be used
for payment of Soviet deliveries of equipment
and materials and repayments would be in the
form of "raw m aterials, tea, gold, American
dollars."

I t was apparent that there was a clash of trad itio n al Sino-Soviet
interests.

Americans in turn overlooked this underlying s p lit between

the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

Instead United

States policy makers emphasized the Sino-Soviet alliance and attacked
the treaty as proof of the Soviet conquest of China.
Louis J. H alle, a State Department o ffic e r, wrote an a rtic le
in the New York Times Magazine that certain American diplomats were
well aware of the "long record of co n flic t between Mao and Moscow.
They were, however, intimidated into silence, or i f they tried to
speak out th e ir careers and reputations were ruined by accusations
of treason."^

State Department telegrams labeled the government of

the People's Republic of China, the "Chi Commis," and reiterated
that this regime would not be recognized by the United States.

^Halle, Louis J ., "After Vietnam—Another Witch Hunt?"
New York Times Magazine, June 6, 1971, p. 44.
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This nonrecognition policy placed the United States against the
largest, most in flu en tial state in Asia, a nation which numbered 650
m illion people.

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk summed up the

rig id American China policy in early 1951:
The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian
government—a Slavic Manchukuo on a large scale.
I t is not the Government of China. I t does not
pass the f ir s t test. I t is not Chinese.1
United States Commitment to Taiwan
The United States government has maintained a m ilita ry and
diplomatic commitment to support the Nationalist Chinese government
every since the outbreak of World War I I , with one six month exception
This b rie f six month suspension of United States support for
theNationalists came in 1950.

President

Truman announced onJanuary

5, 1950 that "the United States would not provide m ilitary aid or
advice to Chinese forces on Formosa."

2

President Truman changed

his mind six months la te r following the outbreak of the Korean War.
At this time he ordered the United States' Seventh Fleet to prevent
any Communist Chinese attack on Formosa.
Large-scale intervention of the Chinese Communist forces in
Korea in November 1950 insured American support of the Nationalist
regime.

I t also brought a resolution in the United Nations General

Assembly declaring Peking guilty of aggression.

This decision marked

^Department of State B u lle tin , XXIV (May 28, 1951), p. 847.
^"Taiwan Regime: Major Obstacle to US-Peking Ties,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. XXIX, No. 46 (Nov. 13,
1971), p. 2340.
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a turning point in the policy of the United States toward admitting
the government of the People's Republic of China to the United
Nations.

In the f i r s t six months of 1949 prior to the outbreak

of the Korean War, United States policy on the admission of the
Chinese leadership to the United Nations had been based on Dean
Acheson's March 8, 1950 statement that the United States would vote
to seat the Peking regime in the United Nations while i t recognized
the Republic of China (Taiwan), but would also refrain from using
the veto and would accept the majority decision of the United Nations.
United States Continues to Contain the Peking Regime
During the summer of 1954, the Chinese leadership increased
th e ir m ilita ry pressure on Quemoy, Matsu and the Tachens in r e ta lia 
tion for the negotiation of the United States sponsored Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO).

To underscore its support of

the Formosa regime the United States on December 2, 1954 signed a
mutual security treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan).
On January 18, 1955 Chinese Communists invaded the offshore
island of Ichiang, 210 miles north of Formosa and launched a massive
bombardment of the Tachen Islands, eight miles from Ichiang.

With

a Communist invasion of the Tachens appearing imminent, President
Eisenhower, in a special message January 24 to Congress, asked for
e x p lic it authority to use American armed forces to protect Formosa,
the adjoining Pescadores Islands and "related positions and
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te rrito rie s ."^

The President's request received prompt action in

Congress.
During this period of time there had been a deterioration
in Soviet-American relations.

From the mid-1950's onward Peking

disavowed Moscow's concept of "peaceful coexistence" and any move
ment toward a Sino-American rapprochement.

China opposed summit

meetings and c ritic iz e d Kruschev's restra in t in not sending troops
to Lebanon in 1958 to drive out American soldiers.

Communist

Chinese leaders were d e fin ite ly opposed to a Communist detente with
the United States in the 1950s.
the Sino-American confrontation:

They remembered the history of
American aid before 1949 to Chiang

Kai-shek; Chinese attacks on Americans; Washington's nonrecognition
policy; Chinese attacks on American "imperialism"; the Sino-Soviet
Treaty of 1950; American obstruction of Chinese membership in the
United Nations; continuing American aid to Chiang; and the SinoAmerican m ilita ry clash in Korea.
During the 1950s Chiang reiterated that he planned to return
to the mainland.

During this period the United States gave Chiang

an annual average of over $250 m illion in economic and m ilita ry aid.
The Seventh Fleet remained in the Formosa S tra its , causing the
Communists to suggest that this situation was intolerable to them—
i t was as i f China had stationed vessels between Hawaii and the
United States.

China was almost surrounded by American bases and

^ibid.
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armed forces by the late 1950s.
from Japan to South Korea.

These bases and forces extended

In 1957 the United States placed on

Taiwan missiles capable of fir in g nuclear warheads.
The United States also refused economic or cultural contacts
with China.

American journalists were forbidden to accept China's

1956 in v ita tio n to v is it the mainland.

During the 1954 Geneva Con

ference on Indochina Chinese and American diplomats would not greet
one another.

During the conference Foreign Minister Chou En-lai

approached Secretary o f State John Foster Dulles intending to shake
hands.

Dulles refused Chou's approach by turning his back.
In August 1958, the Chinese Communists resumed m ilitary

operations against the Nationalist-held offshore islands concentrating
heavy a r t ille r y barrages against Quemoy.
rapidly.

As in 1954, tensions mounted

Dulles flew to Taiwan October 20 for talks with Chiang.

The

United States and the Nationalists reaffirmed the 1954 treaty and
"recognized that under present conditions the defense of the Quemoys
together with the Matsus is closely related to the defense of Taiwan
and the Pescadores."^

Dulles, in a film interview released by the

State Department October 23, 1958, said the United States "was not
going to attack or tolerate attacks against the Chinese Communists,"
but that the United States government would "stand firm" to resist
any Chinese Communist attacks.

During Dulles' stay in Taiwan, he

persuaded Chiang to reduce his forces deployed on the offshore islands

^ibid.

^ibid.
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by one-third.

A fter the Nationalists did cut back th e ir forces on

the islands, the Communists soon scaled down th e ir a r t ille r y bom
bardments to an every-other-day a ffa ir of no m ilita ry significance.
Since 1959 there has been l i t t l e tension in the Taiwan s tr a it, and
the Communists have ceased bombardment of the offshore islands.
In the 1960s the United States Seventh Fleet presence in
the Taiwan s tr a it was reduced to a two-destroyer patrol which was
ended in November 1969.

The United States' commitment to Chiang did

not diminish even with the culmination of tension in the Taiwan
S tra it.

Under the mutual defense tre a ty, reinforced by the congres

sional resolution, the United States continued its massive program
of m ilita ry and economic assistance to Taiwan.

With the increase of

American involvement in Vietnam the United States continued to build
up its forces on Taiwan.

Taiwan became a supply, staging and training

area for certain United States units used in Vietnam.
Sino-Soviet Dispute
The visib le quarrel between the Peoples Republic of China
and the Soviet Union began in July 1963 at the time of the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty.
The Chinese maintain that th e ir dispute with the Soviets
began with the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet party in February
1956.

At this time Kruschev introduced the policies of destaliniza-

tion and peaceful coexistence. .
The Soviets in turn accept 1956 as the starting point of
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the Sino-Soviet dispute.

They opposed Mao's "cult of personality"

and his opposition to th e ir de-Stalinization program.
One could see the new direction in Soviet China policy by
1954-55.

But i t was not until 1957-1958 that Chinese policy had

d e fin ite ly taken on a leftward direction, both in domestic and
foreign a ffa irs .

This direction in Chinese policy brought the

Soviets and the Chinese into a violent collision course.
The Chinese believe that th e ir revolutionary experience is
unique, and that China represents the "oppressed" nations of the
underdeveloped world.

Mao adapted the Marxian-Lenin theory of

proletarian revolution to the needs of China.

Liu Shao-ch'i in an

address to a Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australian nations
on November 23, 1949 claimed that the way of Mao Tse-tung was the
only possible way to be followed by the Asian peoples and elsewhere
in the underdeveloped world.
The Soviet Union, in contrast to China, feels that a "tradition"
has grown up whereby she holds the special, leading position in the
world communist movement.
China presents two challenges to Soviet authority:
as a great power and secondly, as an ideological leader.

f ir s t

The struggle

over these two issues is essentially what the Sino-Soviet dispute
is about.
The Chinese claim that the modern revisionists (that is the
Soviet Union) have "betrayed Marxism-Leninism, the path of the
October Revolution and proletarian internationalism," and that " it
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is imperative to oppose modern revisionism in order to keep firm ly
to the path of the October Revolution."^

China accuses the modern

revisionists of pushing the Soviet Union on the road towards a
restoration of capitalism.

The Cultural Revolution in China

supposedly prevented a Soviet type of restoration towards capitalism
in China.
Mao's decision to "lean to one side" in the autumn of 1948
was required by the real p o litik situation in the world.

By 1949

the international situation was in a state of cold war and extreme
polarization into opposing blocs.

Of course American aid to Chiang

during the Chinese C ivil War had provoked the Communists.

The Chinese

Communists had good reason to fear the American policy of "containment
of Communism."

United States Secretary of State Acheson expressed

the hope that "the profound c iv iliz a tio n and the democratic individ
ualism of China w ill reassert themselves and she w ill throw o ff
the foreign yoke."

2

The Chinese Communists f e lt that the main value of the SinoSoviet alliance was the m ilita ry and p o litic a l backing i t offered
them.

This was v ita l to the newly established government in Peking.

At this early stage of development any new regime is most vulnerable
to foreign and domestic attack.

The economic aid which China

received from the Soviet Union was fa r less important than the
p o litic a l and m ilita ry support.

^People's Daily E d ito ria l, Nov. 7, 1965.

p

Acheson, Dean. Letter of Transmittal to the White Paper.
United States Relations with China, p. xvi.
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Certain items of national interest contained in the SinoSoviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance con
cluded in February 1950—referring to Soviet rights in Manchuria,
the status of Outer Mongolia, plus the exploitation of Sinkaing—
were not agreeable to China.

One can see reiterated again that as

fa r as the Chinese were concerned economic and te r r ito r ia l considera
tions were second in importance to m ilitary and p o litic a l demands.
The Korean War and the death of Stalin
In 1950 China found i t necessary to overcome major economic
and social dislocations.

During the Korean War there was a great

leeway for Sino-Soviet differences.

There is evidence that China

wanted more Soviet aid during the f ir s t year of the war.
demanded that this aid be delivered more rapidly.

Also, China

Other problems

included Soviet objection to the worldwide value of "the way of
Mao Tse-tung." and disagreement were Soviet rights in Manchuria and
the jo in t stock companies.
As far as the international scene was concerned, the Korean
War helped to further isolate China both p o litic a lly and economically
I t was natural that this situation forced China into a closer re la 
tionship with the Soviet Union despite sharp Sino-Soviet points of
contention.
1954-1955
The best period of Sino-Soviet relations occurred between
S talin 's death and the Twentieth Party Congress.

China was no longer
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overly dependent on the Soviet Union a fte r the Korean War.

She

had successfully consolidated her power at home and had been suc
cessful in causing a stalemate in the Korean War.

S talin 's death

l e f t Mao as the most legitimate Communist leader.
Because the Chinese wanted to modernize and ind ustrialize
th e ir nation on the Soviet model, they continued to seek aid from
the Soviet Union.

The post Stalin leadership in the Soviet Union

which was attempting to establish its legitimacy turned to China
for support.
On the world scene China was emerging as an independent
would-be great power.

Her self-confidence was due to her success

in bringing about a stalemate in the Korean War, also order had
been established at home, a great deal of economic and p o litic a l
progress achieved, land reform completed and a formal constitution
was established in 1954.
Chinese diplomacy was impressive at the 1954 Geneva Confer
ence and the 1955 Bandung Conference.

China was no longer isolated

from her Asian neighbors; she had established diplomatic relations
with many of them.

In Asia Chinese influence had come to challenge

that of the Soviet Union.

The Chinese concluded that th e ir rela tio n 

ship with the Soviets should be one between equals.
The Soviet Union refused to accept China as an equal partner.
She preferred to tre a t China as one of her c lie n t states—only
d iffe re n t from the other Communist powers by virtue of her size.
China began to intervene in Soviet-European a ffa irs and
continued pushing for a leading role in Asia.

She did not support
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Kruschev's attempts to woo India and other Asian nations afte r 1955.
During Krushchev's 1954 v is it to Peking China brought up the status
of Outer Mongolia.

Soviet pledges of support for the Chinese

Communists during the 1954 Taiwan Straits c ris is were disappointing.
This same situation occurred again during the 1958 Taiwan Straits
c ris is .
1956-66— Increasing Sino-Soviet Rivalry
There were a number of reasons for the deepening of the
Sino-Soviet dispute:

(1) conflicts of national interest; (2) opposing

ideological positions; (-3) differences in the social and economic
characteristics of both nations and (4) domestic as well as foreign
policy differences.

Probably the most important factor in this

dispute was the power relationship between the two nations.
China, as well as the majority of newly emerging third world
nations, rejected the bipolarization of international relations.

Due

to China's greater size and potential influence, she became more
independent and dangerous to the Soviet Union and the United States.
Both superpowers preferred to have China under Soviet influence.
From 1955-57 China stood for the interests of the small
nations against "great-power chauvinism."

Later she asserted herself

more and consequently the smaller nations classified her with the
Soviet Union and the United States.
By 1958 China began her own independent nuclear program.
She decided to acquire these weapons when the Soviet nuclear
guarantee contained in the jo in t Sino-Soviet Alliance came into
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question.

The United States had supported Soviet reluctance to

give China nuclear weapons.
Both Russia and China look at the world through an ideo
logical framework.

Resolution of differences is d iffic u lt to achieve

because any area of con flict cannot be treated in isolation.

In

disputes over ideological issues both China and the Soviet Union
find themselves speaking to the world communist movement.
At the Moscow Conference in November 1960 the Chinese
openly challenged Soviet ideological leadership.

But from 1958 on

the Sino-Soviet dispute led to a new polarization of forces.

China

continued to force the pace of the disagreement.
China's attack on India in 1962 was the turning point in
her relationship with both the Soviet Union and the United States.
In spite of the war Soviet m ilitary aid to India continued.

In a

statement of October 25, 1962, the Chinese government had pledged
its support for the Soviet Union in the Cuban missile c ris is .

But

as soon as the Soviet Union had agreed to withdraw her missiles from
Cuba, China immediately denounced the arrangement as an example of
the "cowardice" of modern revisionism.
in China.

Massive ra llie s were held

China's argument that the Soviet Union was guilty of

"adventurism" in sending the missiles to Cuba, and of "capitulationism"
in withdrawing them greatly angered the Soviet leadership.

This

criticism , coupled with the Sino-Indian border, caused the Soviet
Union to decide to contain Communist China along with the United
States.
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The idea of Kruschev's "peaceful co-existence" was dis
gusting to the Chinese.

Between 1957 and 1959 China began to see

herself as having to go i t alone.

She also began to see Moscow as

a power that would sacrifice her fo r its own objectives.
In the 1960s practically a ll engineers, students and experts
were withdrawn from China.

The sporadic Sino-Soviet meetings held

a fte r that t "jins were sijpposedly to mend the widening breach between
the two countries.
In reply to the Chinese charge that Moscow was g u ilty of
"adventurism" and "capitulationism" in the face of "im perialist
nuclear blackmail" in the Cuban situation Kruschev, reporting to
the Supreme Soviet in December 1962 noted that i f imperialism was
a "paper tiger" i t was equipped with nuclear teeth.

He baited

Peking with parallels about China's withdrawal from Indian te rrito ry
and Peking's fa ilu re to liberate Hong Kong and Macao.
replied sharply.

Peking

I f China's humiliation was to be raised Russia

was numbered among the im perialist powers that had forced "unequal
treaties" upon China.

Peking ended with the warning that China had

not yet presented its case.
After continuing debates in 1962 at various party Congresses
polemics were temporarily halted.

B ilateral talks were proposed by

the Russians and entered into on February 21, 1963.

On March 8, 1963

Peking said that the "unequal treaties" imposed on China by ts a ris t
Russia might have to be revised.
Later in May Moscow also proposed talks on the boarder question.
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I t was at this point that the issue of racism was f i r s t
raised.

Just before the talks opened in Moscow in July the Chinese

provocatively aired a ll th e ir old charges.

The Russians replied and

added that the Chinese had tried to prevent Russian and European
participation at the 1963 Tanganyikan Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference
on the grounds that "the whites have nothing to do here."

Moscow also

rebuked Peking for nonchalance about nuclear war, which China allegedly
favored on the grounds that the destruction of the im perialist powers
would follow, but that some Chinese would survive.
talks ended on July 20 without any agreement.

The b ila te ra l

The Chinese soon turned

down Kruschev's offer to resume economic and technical cooperation
charging that Moscow used its economic strength to "bully" and dominate
its a llie s .
Reports started coming in about serious incidents along the
Chinese-Soviet border in Sinkiang Province.

Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and

other national groups liv e on both sides of that border.

Both sides

stated that since 1960 some tens of thousands of people had crossed
into the Soviet Union.

According to the Chinese they were incited and

coerced by Soviet agents; according to the Russians, they sought
refuge from Chinese maltreatment.

The Russians also accused Peking

of numerous fro n tie r violations.
As the r i f t grew the border question became ever more
important.

In an interview reported in the Japanese press, Mao

Tse-tung suggested that the Soviet Union should return the Kurile
Islands to Japan; he sensed Soviet vulnerability on the whole question
of Soviet fro ntiers.

He also talked of Soviet appropriation of
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part of Rumania, Poland, East Germany, Finland and Mongolia.

He

noted that "a hundred years ago the region east of Baikal became
Russian te rrito ry and, since then, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka
and other places have become te rrito ry of the Soviet Union."

China,

he added, had not yet presented its reckoning fo r th is.
Kruschev responded on September 15.
frontiers of the Soviet Union were sacred.

He warned that the
He then asked what the

Chinese were doing i.n Sinkiang, an area populated by a people
ethnically d iffere n t from the Chinese.
The border issue is v ita lly important to world peace because
should serious h o s tilitie s occur (which could very possibly be a
nuclear war) the entire world would be affected.
With the f a ll of Kruschev (1964) Brezhnev and Kosygin tried
to patch up the r i f t with the Chinese but the differences were too
great.

No agreement was reached.
On October 16, 1964 in Sinkiang, China exploded her f ir s t

atomic bomb and Chou En-lai appealed for a summit of a ll countries
to disavow the nuclear weapons.
In 1965 the co n flict with Moscow reached a new intensity.
Anti-Soviet demonstrations in Peking began in March following the
alleged suppression in Moscow of a Vietnam r a lly by Chinese students.
Demonstrations continued throughout 1966 and 1967 until almost a ll
students were eith er expelled or withdrawn.

Also in 1965, 47 Chinese

scientists working at the Joint Nuclear Research In stitu te at Dunba
returned to Peking.

Kosygin did v is it Peking in February 1965, and
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Mao did send anniversary greetings to Moscow in celebration of the
Russian Revolution, but the dispute passed over into the fie ld of
international organizations when the Chinese called on the World
Federation of Trade Unions at its October Congress in Warsaw to
oppose "peaceful co-existence."
By 1965 Mao decided to remove every obstacle that would
delay the achievement of his goal of restoring China's hegemony
f ir s t in Asia and secondly throughout the rest of the world.

S t ill

Lenin's promise to China concerning the abrogation of the "unequal
treaties" had not been carried out in Soviet actions.
During 1965 the Vietnam War began to escalate.

September

3, 1965 China's Defense M inister, Lin Piao, emphasized the role of
the developing countries (world countryside) over the world c ity
(developed countries).

In other words he restated the Maoist case

against the Soviet Union in the context of the Chinese strategic
debate over Vietnam.

This was a direct threat to Moscow's leadership

role in the Communist world.
Beginning in 1966 the Chairman instigated the Cultural
Revolution to bolster his domestic authority and therefore to better
achieve his objectives.
were eventually purged.

Those who opposed him, Conmunist or not,
The Chinese Communist Party, Mao's chief

in s titu tio n a l opposition, was e ffe c tiv e ly dealt with by the Red
Guards and the m ilita ry .

A m ilitary-bureaucratic dictatorship con

tro lle d by Mao and his heir to the regime, Lin Piao, was the result
of the Cultural Revolution.

An important aspect of this was an

intense h o s itility toward the Soviet Union.

Lin's orders to the
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officers and soldiers in the Chinese People's Liberation Army were
always to think and act in accordance with the teachings of Mao.
During the in it ia l Red Guard stage, the Cultural Revolution
also extended into Chinese border lands.

Inner Mongolian and

Sinkiang leaders who occupied important positions as Communists were
purged because of being "counter-revolutionary" nationalists.
As the Cultural Revolution mushroomed in 1966, Peking again
meddled in the po litics of Eastern Europe where a resurgence of
nationalism was occurring and where a number of party leaders were
maneuvering for greater autonomy.
ences in Czechoslovakia and Sofia.
Albania and Rumania.

Polemics were exchanged at confer
In June, Chou En-lai visited

He praised the Rumanians and encouraged them

in th e ir struggle against outside interference.

In March 1966 the

Chinese and Soviets clashed over Vietnam and borders.

A "secret"

Soviet le tte r was leaked to fraternal parties that charged Peking
with rejecting jo in t action in Vietnam, with hindering the transport
of Soviet war materials, and with promoting fro n tie r clashes.

In

December Foreign Minister Chen Yi informed a Brazilian journalist
that Moscow had moved troops from Eastern Europe and had b u ilt up
13 divisions on the Chinese fro n tier.
In early 1967 Chinese demonstrations outside the Soviet
embassy in Peking were of unprecedented size and duration.

Soviet

families were manhandled at the Peking airport on th eir way home.
Sharp protests were exchanged, with Peking identifying the Kremlin
leaders with H itle r , the Czar and Chiang Kai-shek.
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China announced the explosion of her f ir s t hydrogen bomb
on June 17, 1967.
In 1968 the fin a l defeat of Lin Shao Chi and the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia were the focal points of sharp polemics.
China was seeking support among friendly Communist nations.

She

managed to sign up Albania which did not trust the Soviets due to
the fact that a fte r World War I I Stalin had offered to give their
nation to Tito.

Chinese behavior during the East European crisis

had provoked the Soviet Union.

Following the Soviet invasion of

Czechoslovakia, Peking supported the "people" of Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania.
Most of the Asian Communist countries disliked Mao because
of the Cultural Revolution but they preferred Peking to the Soviets.
Immediately following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968
Mao reinforced China's border regions with more regular troops.
China did this a fte r learning of the Brezhnev Doctrine.
serious tension existed on the Sino-Soviet border region.
more incidents developed along this boundary.

During 1968
More and

Travel was d iffic u lt;

people were questioned and baggage searched.
I t was reported by the Soviets that conditions in Sinkiang
had become so intolerable that more than 60,000 Russians, Uighurs,
and Kazakhs, including many anti-Soviet White Russians fled over the
fro n tier into the Soviet Union.
The Ussuri border clash reached the high point in Si noSoviet riv a lry .
Thus by early 1969 Moscow and Peking were suffering the most
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deterioration in relations since Mao came to power.

From March on

ward, they charged each other with border violations along the Ussuri
River and in other areas.

These incidents were used to s t ir up new

waves of anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese feelings, and to prepare each
nation for mass m ilita ry buildups and war scares.

On June 18 talks

started between the delegations of the Sino-Soviet Frontier Naviga
tion Commission; an agreement was reached on navigation of fro n tie r
rivers.

But Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated further a fte r the

Conference on World Corranunist Parties in Moscow in June.

China was

not formally condemned, but in the course of the debates the "Mao
clique" was denounced.

Nevertheless, Kosygin visited Peking following

the funeral of Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi, and large-scale talks were begun
in October.
The Chinese, according to Hong Kong reports, do not expect
the return of the land.

They are, however, seeking Soviet acknowledge

ment of the Russian imposition of these "unequal tre a tie s ."
The Russians, in turn, refuse to y ie ld .

They are associating

the present "eastern threat" with Mongol incursion of the 13th century.
They further reply that Chinese te r r ito r ia l demands are pure chauvinism
and the Chinese have repeatedly violated the Sino-Soviet boundaries.
They continuously warn that the frontiers of the Soviet Union are
sacred and that anyone who dares to violate them w ill meet with a
"resolute rebuff."

The war scare of September 1969 has been eased;

Moscow and Peking started high-level negotiations in October, but
the talks have not modified the position of either side.
The m ilita ry buildups continue.

Thirty or more Soviet
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divisions, moved to the Chinese fro n tie r in the summer of 1969,
s t i l l stand poised in strike positions.

In 1967 the Soviets had

only 12 or 13 divisions.

Of these, i t is estimated, only two were

fu ll strength divisions.

At that time, moreover, there were no

Soviet units of any consequence in Outer Mongolia.

Today the

fro n tie r divisions have been brought up to fu ll strength, are deployed
in Outer Mongolia, and are armed with a r t ille r y , rockets, a irc r a ft,
and a ll the equipment necessary fo r waging a conventional or nuclear
war.

The change in m ilita ry buildup is strikin g .
In China, underground a ir-ra id shelters are being b u ilt,

grain stockpiled, troops moved to border regions, and people, even
the youngest school children, are being d rille d in protective measures
against nuclear war.

So intense is the h o s tility that the Chinese

charge they are confronted not with a friendly communist a lly , but
with a hereditary enemy.

They warn th e ir people that Russia has

embarked on a policy to destroy China, not only as a communist power
but as a nation.

The "Ussuri Incident" and incidents following

March 2-15, 1969 did not solve the problem of ownership of Chenpoa
or Damansky Island.
Therefore, Moscow and Peking stand today much as they did
in the 19th century, as trad ition al enemies.
much more complex.

But the situation is

They are arguing not only over national frontiers

but ideologies and conflicting interests as w e ll.

With a quarrel

that is a mix of nationalism, asymmetrical interests, and ideology,
only a change in international p o litic s and hard negotiations by
cooperative Chinese and Russian diplomats can bring about the return
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of that b rie f and temporary period of friendship that they enjoyed
immediately a fte r World War I I .
By the end of 1969 a standoff along the Sino-Soviet border
had been achieved.

China and the Soviet Union began to engage in

more complicated maneuvers against each other with the aim of getting
significant p o litic a l advantages without war.

The most important

area was so called competitive detente with the United States.
Peking'-s Opening to the United States
As the weaker party to the Sino-Soviet confrontation,
Peking was more anxious than Moscow in bringing about detente with
the United States.

Competition with Moscow was not the only motive;

other reasons included:

progress toward the "liberation" of Taiwan

through erosion of the American commitment to the Republic of China,
and technological contact with the United States.

American p o litic s

and foreign policy—p a rtic u la rly the Nixon Administration's need for
Chinese help in ending the Vietnam War, and for leverage in dealing
with the Soviet Union—created some American vuln erab ilities and
exposed the United States to Chinese manipulation.
Chinese p o litic s created problems for Si no-American detente
due to the powerful faction o f Maoist radicals who opposed i t .

This

reason helps to explain why the detente was not solid u n til Lin Piao's
f a ll in September 1971.

After that incident detente progressed much

more smoothly for about two years, and then again showed signs of
strain a fte r the radicals began to reassert themselves in the summer
of 1973.
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Peking did not expect a m ilitary alliance or guarantee from
the United States against the Soviet Union; domestic po litics and
foreign policies of both China and the United States forbade such a
commitment.

But Peking hoped that the United States would serve as

a counterweight to Soviet pressures on China in the form of a SinoAmerican relationship improved to the point to create in the minds of
the Soviet leadership a significant uncertainty about the probable
American reaction to a Soviet attack on China.
been achieved until at least 1973.

This seems to have

Also there was the consideration

that Peking did not want to permit the Soviet Union to achieve a
closer relationship with the United States than China had it s e lf .
The f ir s t step was to get President Nixon to come to China.
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CHAPTER III
NIXON'S PRESIDENCY AND HIS CHINA POLICY
As an interested private c itiz e n , Richard M. Nixon wrote
an a rtic le that was published in Foreign Affairs in October, 1967.
We cannot afford to leave China forever outside
the family of Nations, there to nurture its
fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its
neighbors. . .
The world cannot be safe until China changes.
Our safety depends upon the extent that we can
influence events.
Richard Nixon's a rtic le suggested the best method in meeting
the problem would be to use short-range policies that would advance
long-range goals.

For instance, a short run policy of firm restrain t

at f ir s t toward membership fo r the People's Republic in the United
Nations and suggestions of th e ir entering foreign trade.
this nature would not denote approval of her conduct.

Acts of

Further, Peking

should be persuaded, not forced, to accept basic rules of international
c iv ilit y .

Mr. Nixon emphasized the importance of persuading the

leaders of the People's Republic to have the desire to change from an
is o la tio n is t position in international relations to that of a renewed
interest in the outside world which would satisfy China's imperial
ambition and inspire her to find a solution for her domestic problems.

72
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Mr. Nixon at that time was concerned with the safety of the
United States.

He wrote:
The West faces two prospects in the next decade
that create a cris is for the First order. (1)
The Soviets may reach nuclear parity with us.
(2) China, within 3 to 5 years w ill have a
significant deliverable nuclear capability. . .
China w ill be outside any nonproliferation tre a ty ~
and free i f i t chooses to scatter its weapons
among "liberation" forces anywhere in the world.
Our long-range aim should be to pull China back
into the family of nations, as a great progressive
nation, not as the epicenter of world revolutionJ

In 1968 President Richard M. Nixon immediately began to put
his China Policy into practice.
Communism—any brand or la b e l--is not the subject of this
discussion.

I t is an important facto r, however, in the part i t plays

in the Nixon foreign policy toward China.
John G. Stoessinger in his book en titled Nations in Darkness
explains that the long standing co n flict between the United States
and China refers to two d istin c t free ideologies which collide without
mutual comprehension.

He further states:

Reflection shows that neither the American nor
the Chinese images t a lly with the facts. No
one dimensional Communist-devil theory showing how
American capitalism attacked, betrayed, and
exploited the Chinese people w ill do. Nor is the
American self-image of moral superiority any more
satisfacto ry.2
The American image of a heroic Chiang between 1936
and 1945 as a leading defender of democracy against
communism has provided the basis for most

^Nixon, Richard M., "Asia After Vietnam."
October, 1967 (Vol. 46, No. 1 ), p. 121.

Foreign A ffa irs ,

2

Stoessinger, John. Nations in Darkness: China, Russia,
and America (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 29.
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United States China policy decisions.^
By mid-1969 the time was ripe for a fresh United States
approach to China.

The Cultural Revolution and the 9th Party Congress

were over, and the essence of Peking's policy seemed to be s t a b ili
zation of diplomatic relations at least to the pre-Cultural Revolution
level.^
Most important of a l l , China was under Soviet p o litic a l and
m ilita ry pressure on account of the Sino-Soviet border dispute and i t
was probably hoped in Washington that Peking would therefore be more
fle x ib le in its attitud e toward the United States and conceivably
toward Taiwan.
At Guam in July, 1969, the President had enunciated what
became known as the "Nixon Doctrine," which foreshadowed a deciding
American commitment to Asia.^

Certainly, i t meant that in future

Vietnam-type situations, America would "look to the nation d irec tly
threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the
5
manpower for its defense."

1ib id . , p. 32.
2
Hinton, Harold. The Bear at the Gate (Washington:
In s titu te for Public Policy Research, 1971), p. 92.

American

^i bi d.
4
U. S. President. Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Richard Nixon, 1969. (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing O ffice, 1971), pp. 544-45.
^Secretary of State. United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970
(Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing O ffice, March 1971), p.
36.
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Ping Pong Diplomacy
Despite the ups and downs of United States' communications
with Peking, the general trend on both sides was clearly toward
increased contact.

On April 30, 1971, Edgar Snow wrote in Life

magazine about his December 18, 1970, interview with Mao:
Should rig h tis ts lik e Nixon, who represented
the monopoly c a p ita lis ts , be permitted to come?
Mao explained, at present the problems between
China and the USA would have to be solved with
Nixon.- Mao would be happy to talk with him eith er
as a to u ris t or as President.'
On April 7, 1971, Peking invited the United States Table
Tennis Team, attending a world tournament in Japan, to v is it the
Mainland. In

greeting the table tennis players, Premier Chou En-lai

stated that th e ir tr ip had "opened a new page in

the relations of the

Chinese and American People."
The Nixon Administration's responses included:

F irs t, on

April 14, 1971, President Nixon announced fiv e measures in a single
package to show his pleasure.

They were:

(1)

A relaxation of the

20-year old embargo on United States' trade with the People's Republic
of China (a l i s t of items placed on the general license was subsequently
made public on June 10, 1971).^

(2) A pledge to "expedite" visas

^Snow, Edgar, "A Conversation with Mao Tse-tung."
April 30, 1971, p. 48.

L ife ,

U. S. Department of State. Office of Media Services,
Bureau of Public A ffa irs . Communist China: East Asian and Pacific
Series 203, Pubn. 8605 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing
O ffice, 1971), p. 3.
^Newsweek, April 26, 1971, p. 17.
^New York Times, June 11, 1971, p, 8.
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fo r Chinese citizens wishing to v is it the United States.

(3)

A

relaxation of United States currency controls to permit the People's
Republic to pay for imports with dollars and to allow American
citizens to send checks to China without f ir s t obtaining permission.
(4) Permission for American o il companies to sell fuel to ships or
planes bound to or from the People's Republic, except for Chinese c ra ft
heading to or from North Vietnam, North Korea or Cuba.

(5)

Authoriza

tion for United States ships or planes to carry Chinese cargoes between
non-Chinese ports, and for American-owned carriers that operate under
foreign flags to v is it the People's Republic it s e lf .
Then, on April 16, the Washington Post reported a Nixon
remark that he would lik e to v is it Peking during his tenure as the
President of the United States.

Later, on April 20, i t was announced

that Peking had accepted the American invitation to send a ping-pong
team to v is it the United States.^
Subsequently, an increasing number of American journalists
who had in general been barred from the People's Republic since 1949,
were admitted.

The People's Republic then allowed some American

sc ien tists, students, and others to v is it.

The Department of State

announced that visa applications for visitors from the People's
Republic would be processed expeditiously under existing visa
regulations.
The f ir s t o ffic ia l United States v is ito r to the People's
Republic from 1949 to 1971 was Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s

^New York Times, April 21, 1971, p. 1.
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Assistant for National Security A ffa irs , who held talks in Peking
with Premier Chou En-lai from July 9 to 11, 1971.

From Dr. Kissinger's

conversations came the jo in t announcement of President Nixon's fo rth • .1
coming *tr ip
After the Kissinger mission, President Nixon confirmed that
the United States would not abandon Taiwan

or its Asian a llie s ,

although a ll of them, especially Japan and of course the Republic of
China, had been affected in various ways by recent developments in
Sino-American relations.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers

announced support on August 2, 1971 for "two Chinas" in the United
2
Nati ons.
Why the Nixon trip?
To understand why the United States did not seek to establish
relations with Peking at an e a rlie r date and why President Nixon was
able to move with re la tiv e freedom at home at the time he did, one
must look largely to American domestic p o litic s .

To understand why

the President decided to seek improvement in Sino-American relation s,
one must look largely to his conception of United States national
security interests and his view of how the world operates.

To under

stand why the move was made as i t was, one must look both to American
domestic p o litic s and to the President's style.

^Communist China, op. c i t . , p. 3.
2
Hinton, op. c i t . , p. 99.
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President Nixon accepts invitatio n to v is it
the Republic of China
President Nixon made the following statement to the Nation
on television and radio, July 15, 1971:
I have requested this television time tonight to
announce a major development in our efforts to
build a lasting peace in the world.
As I have pointed out on a number of occasions over
the past 3 years, there can be no stable and en
during peace without the participation of the
People's Republic of China and its 750 m illion
people. That is why I have undertaken in itia tiv e s
in several areas to open the door for more normal
relations between our two countries.
In pursuance of that goal, I sent Dr. Kissinger, my
Assistant for National Security A ffa irs , to Peking
during his recent world tour for the purpose of
having talks with Premier Chou E n-lai.
. . . In anticipation of the inevitable speculation
which w ill follow this announcement, I want to put
our policy in the clearest possible context. Our
action in seeking a new relationship with the
People's Republic of China w ill not be at the expense
of our old friends.
I t is not directed against any other nation. . . I
have taken this action because of my profound con
viction that a ll nations w ill gain from a reduction
of tensions and a better relationship between the
U. S. and the People's Republic of China.'
James Reston wrote an a rtic le in the New York Times August
7, 1971, en titled "A View of Nixon from Peking"in which he stated:
President Nixon is handling his relations with
this sensitive and highly suspicious capital about
as well as anybody could do under the circumstances.
He is tiptoeing through a mine fie ld , which extends

^Communist China, op. c i t . , p .3.
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through Tokyo, Saigon and Hanoi, and could easily
be blown up at any point, but so fa r has been
remarkably effective.
The Role of the United States in the Fight to Keep the
People's Republic Unrepresented in the United Nations
The United States played a leading role in the struggle to
keep the People's Republic out of the United Nations.

Without American

opposition, the People's Republic would have been admitted to the
United Nations long-ago.

Many countries voted against Peking's

representation, or abstained, because of th e ir susceptibility to
American influence.^
I t should be remembered that the Republic of China was an
original member state of the United Nations and one of the five
permanent members of the Security Council.

The representation question

came about as a result of the Chinese revolution which created two
claimants to China's seat—the Republic of China on Taiwan and the
People's Republic of China on the mainland.
The issue of Chinese membership as i t appeared each year
through 1971 was a matter of credentials, rather than membership.

2

In 1950 the credentials of the communist regime were f la t ly rejected.
From 1951 through 1960 the American strategy was to seek postponement
of this issue.

Thus the United States was able to maintain the status

quo in the United Nations without forcing governments to commit

tio n .

Riggs, Robert. U. S./UN Policy and International OrganizaNew York: Meredith Corp. (1971), pp. 264-65.
2ibid .
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themselves directly on the question of representation.

But since

1961 the Assembly addressed it s e lf d irectly to the central issue and
un til October 25, 1971 rejected motions to replace the Republic of
China delegates with representatives of the Peking government.
"Until 1970 the Nationalist government always received a p lu ra lity ,
with the exception of 1965 when the vote was evenly divided at 47
in favor, 47 opposed, and 20 abstaining."^

(The vote to seat

Communist Chinese representatives was 46 to 57 in 1966; '45 to 58
to 17

in 1967; 44to 58 to 23 in 1968; and 48 to 56 to 21 in 1969.) 2
The 1970 vote went in favor of the People's Republic of

China

by 51 to 49

with 25 abstaining due to a s h ift o f alignments

at least

p a rtia lly dueto the decision of Canada and Ita ly to establish
3
diplomatic ties with Peking.
This did not change the status of
Chinese representation because of an Assembly resolution, f ir s t
adopted in 1961 and reaffirmed in 1970, declaring the matter to be
an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority vote of the
Assembly; but nevertheless as long as i t was in e ffe c t the unseating
of the Nationalists was a remote p o ssibility.^
At the end of 1970 the American o ffic ia l statements seemed
to suggest that the United States China Policy reappraisal had
settled on a two Chinas (or one China, one Taiwan) policy in the

1ibid.
2ibid.

^ibid.
4

Riggs, op. c i t . , p. 264.
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United Nations; in e ffe c t, the United States would concentrate on
trying to keep Taipei in the United Nations rather than on trying
to keep Peking out.
The urgency of the Taiwan problem was underlined in November
1970 by the majority vote in the United Nations General Assembly in
favor of the Albanian resolution, which in previous years called for
the expulsion of Taipei and the seating of Peking, even though the
vote did not take effect because of the prior passage of the Americansponsored "important question" resolution.
On August 2, 1971 when Secretary of State William P. Rogers
announced that the United States would support the seating o f Com
munist China in the United Nations, he said the United States would
oppose any effo rts to "expel the Republic of China or otherwise
deprive i t of representation" in the United Nations.

He avoided

the question of which China should serve on the Security Council,
saying only that the United States would abide by the views of the
majority of United Nations members on the questionJ
October 18, 1971 Ambassador George Bush addressed the United
Nations and reiterated the o ffic ia l United States position supporting
membership for both Chinas.

He said, "Expelling Chiang Kai'shek's

Nationalists could open a Pandora's box inside the world peace
organization."

?

During the twenty year history of the United Nations

^"Policy S h ift: Congress, China, and-the United Nations."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. XXIX, No. 40 (October 2,
1971), p. 2015.
^"Two Chinas in the UN:
The U. S. States its Case."
News and World Report, November 1, 1971, p. 74.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

U.S.

no member had ever been expelled or deprived of its seat.

He drew

attention to the fact that the Chinese Nationalist member had a most
constructive record with no Charter violations.

For i t , or a member

of any country large or small, to be expelled solely because certain
other governments questioned its legitimacy would cause the ruination
of the United Nations.

He asked, " I f the Organization is going to

travel that road, where do we stop?
should be next?"^

Who can predict what UN member

An act of this sort would lead away from uni

v e rs a lity, away from realism toward factionalism, recrimination,
and irrelevancy.

He emphasized the fact that i t would damage the

very fabric of the organization.
President Nixon had started on a defin ite plan that he
soon discovered would require hard bargaining.
After being informed that the o ffic ia l United States'
position supported United Nations membership for the People's Republic
of China and the Republic of China, Peking replied that they "would
take a seat in the United Nations, only i f Nationalist China were
ousted from the United Nations and from the Taiwan Government, as
w e ll." 2
President Nixon had hoped to develop a friendship with the
People's Republic of China, and at the same time honor the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China,
signed at Washington, D.C. on December 2, 1954.

A rticle I I in the

^ib id. , p. 75.
2 ii
UN Seat for Red China."
August 16, 1971, p. 20.

U. S. News and World Report,
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Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of
China states:
In order more e ffec tiv ely to achieve the
objective to this Treaty, the Parties separately
and jo in tly and by self-help and mutual aid w ill
maintain and develop th e ir individual and collec
tiv e capacity to resist armed attack and communist
subversive a c tiv itie s directed from without
against th e ir te r r ito r ia l in te g rity and p o litic a l
s ta b ility J
At his news conference, President Nixon gave the following
reasons for his welcoming Communist China into the United Nations.
He stated that he hoped to discover "areas where the United States,
which today is the most powerful nation in the world, can find an
agreement with the most populous nation in the world, which potentially
o
in the future could become the most powerful nation in the world."
Mr. Nixon was concerned fo r the safety of the world in 1967.
As the President of the United States planning the United States' dis
engagement from Vietnam, he faced a grave responsibility.

If a

friendly atmosphere existed, the People's Republic of China might not
be inclined to contribute war supplies to North Vietnam.

That would

assist the United States to leave sooner and hopefully put an end to
the war.
Friendship with the People's Republic of China would
naturally cause the Soviet Union to realize that she would be faced
with a triangular power situation and that she could no longer
capitalize on the h o s tility between the United States and the People's

^Moorsteen, Richard and Abramowitz, Morton. Remaking China
Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 97.
^"UN Seat for Red China," op. c i t . , p. 21.
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Republic.
Ross T e r r ill, in an a rtic le en titled "The 800,000,000:
China and the World" in the January, 1972 issue of A tlantic Monthly,
gave some very thought provoking explanations as to why he believed
that the United States changed its course in the United Nations re
garding the issue of Peking's membership.
I do not believe that Kissinger and Chou set
the UN issue aside when they met last July—as
was often said in the press. Nor that Peking was
ready to go ahead with detente regardless of what
happened in the UN. I believe that the issue was
set aside, a fte r July, because the two sides knew
what was going to happen in the UN. . . During the
many hours of rather tough ta lk s , the two sides
gave each other a statement of intention on the UN
issue. Since the ta lk dealt with votes and agendas
in an international organization, each side could
state what i t would seek, but not guarantee what
i t would a tta in .
The distinction was crucial. I t permitted two
statements of intention to seem an agreement on
what would resu lt. The Chinese were satisfied with
what they concluded from this diplomacy by in d i
rection. No sign exists that the U. S. was deeply
dissatisfied.
Following this lin e of reasoning i t would seem that the
United States indicated to Peking that i t would support its seating
in the China seat at the United Nations.

Secondly, the Americans

proposed that should Taipei fig h t to keep a United Nations place for
i t s e lf , the United States would support this attempt.

Thirdly, the

United States said that i t did not know whether the attempt to keep
Taipei in the United Nations would succeed or notJ

^ T e rr ill, Ross, "The 800,000,000:
A tlantic Monthly, January, 1972, p. 47.

China and the World."
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Secretary of State Rogers' subsequent statement of August 2,
1971 did not mean quite what i t said on the printed page.
Yes, the United States w ill fig h t to keep a
United Nations place for Chiang Kai-shek. But
i f the Un-ited States "does not know" whether
this w ill succeed, and China is sure i t won't, ,
the two sides are not as fa r apart as they seem.
Washington then came out with a double proposal fo r the
United Nations debate:

Peking to have the China seat; a separate,

lower place to be salvaged for Taipei in the Assembly.

United States'

spokesmen assured that though every e ffo rt was being made, success
fo r the double proposal could not be guaranteed.

By the time Foreign

Minister Fukuda of Japan came to Washington in early September " it
smelled as i f Mr. Rogers were foreshadowing fa ilu re and looking around
2
for others to share whatever blame fa ilu re might trig g e r."
After
President Richard Nixon's and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's
words about the danger of a right-wing rampage in America in the event
of calamity for United States' fortunes in Asia, "no one should be
surprised that Bush was assigned the role of making an elaborate
3
e ffo rt to hold a General Assembly seat fo r Taiwan."
The newspaper
photographs of Kissinger conferring in Peking as the United Nations
voted were more effective than anything Bush said or did in New York.

^ib id .
^i bid.
3loc. c i t . , p. 48.
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"Nixon lost a b attle on October 25, 1971 but salvaged a campaign
(perhaps two campaigns).1,1 The Pakistani delegate at the United
Nations said ju s t a fte r the vote that one big reason for the out2
come was Nixon's new China policy.
Nixon's China Policy ultimately
benefited from the United Nations vote.
Also, as i t was suggested in an a rtic le en titled "U.N. Seat
for Red China" published in U. S. News and World Report August 14,
1971:
The U. S. has v irtu a lly run out of gas in
pursuing its past part of opposing Red China's
admission, backing for Peking in the U. N. has
been climbing almost without interrpution since
1952. . .
Peking had many loyal supporters in the United Nations.

In

fact the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly on
October 25, 1971 to admit Communist China and to expel the Chinese
3
Nationalist government of Taiwan.
The vote, taken at an unexpected
evening session, admitted the Peking government to China's seat in
the Assembly and the Security Council for the f ir s t time in the
Communist regime's twenty-two year history.

The Assembly action

marked the fin a l defeat for the United States in its b attle to keep
Nationalist China in the United Nations.
The fin al vote came on a resolution sponsored by Albania
and twenty other nations, calling for the seating of Peking as the
sole legitimate representative of China and the expulsion of Taiwan.4

^loc. c i t . , p. 48.
2

loc. c i t . , p. 48.

3UN Monthly Chronicle, United Nations Office of Publication,
New York, Vol. V I I I , No. 10, November, 1971, p. 34.
4ibid .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

87

The resolution was adopted 76-35, with 17 absentions.1 The result
was greeted with cheers and jubulation from many of the delegates
in the Assembly.
The Assembly e a rlie r had defeated the United States' resolu
tion to declare the expulsion of Taiwan an "important question"
requiring a two thirds majority.
tions.

2

That vote was 59-55 with 15 absten-

The United States had predicted victory, and its defeat

precipitated the landslide victory for the Albanian resolution.
O ffic ia l United States' reaction to Taiwan's expulsion
In a statement approved by President Nixon and read to
newsmen by Secretary of State Rogers October 26, 1971, the Adminis
tration welcomed Communist China's admission to the United Nations
as "consistent with the policy of the United States."

But said that

"at the same time, the United States deeply regrets the action taken
by the UN to deprive the Republic of China of representation in that
organ.
The statement added:
Although we
proportions
Republic of
the w ill of
expressed.

believe that a mistake of major
has been made in expelling the
China from the UN, the US realizes
the majority of the members has been
We, of course, accept that decision.

1ibid.
ibid .
^New York Times, October 26, 1971, p. 1.
4i bi d.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

.

88

He concluded by saying that the United States hoped the
United Nations would not be weakened by Taiwan's expulsion.
The Nixon policy toward Taiwan
Thus i t can be seen that the Administration made two major
diplomatic in itia tiv e s concerning Nationalist China.
1.

I t supported the seating of the People's Republic of

China in the United Nations, thereby reversing 20 years of opposition
to representation of the Peking regime.
2.

I t has sought to normalize relations with Peking in a

series of moves climaxed by President Nixon's tr ip to mainland ChinaJ
Nationalist response
Both these actions drew sharp criticism from Taipei.

On

July 15, 1971, when President Nixon announced his invitatio n to v is it
China, Nationalist Chinese Premier Yen said that the United States
had been "deceived by the Chinese Communists."

2

He further added that

improved United States' relations with Communist China "could lead to
a tragedy fa r more serious than that involved in the f a ll of the
Chinese mainland" in 1949.
On August 2, 1971 when Rogers announced that the United
States favored admission for Peking in the United Nations but would
oppose efforts to expel Nationalist China, the Nationalist Foreign

^"Taiwan Regime: Major Obstacle to US-Peking Ties."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. XXIX, No. 46 (November
13, T971), p. 2340.
2ibid.
- u - j
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Ministry asked United Nations member states to uphold its "unques
tionable" rig h t to membership in the United Nations.

The ministry

warned that the United Nations "would surely be confronted with the
ever-increasing danger of in f iltr a tio n , subversion and eventual
destruction.
Congressional response to Taiwan's expulsion
Members of the United States Congress, diplomats and law
makers also lost no time in denouncing the United Nations vote that
gave Peking a seat in the organization and expelled Taiwan.
Amendments were introduced to the foreign aid b ill calling,
for big cuts in United States' contributions to the United Nations.
Among the senators in favor of the reduction of financial support for
the United Nations were Democratic Majority leader Mike Mansfield of
Montana and the Republican Minority leader Hugh Scott from Pennsylvania.
"October 29, 1971 the Senate voted to k ill the U.S. foreign aid b ill
3
program by a vote of 41 to 27."
Democrats and Republicans alike were outspoken a fte r the
expulsion of Taiwan.
Senator Russel Long, Democrat from Louisiana, commented "We
ought to ask them (United Nations) to move some place where we don't
have to admit these hordes of foreign agents into our country to spy

^i bi d.
2

"China and the UN: Threats of Retaliation in Congress."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. XXIX, No. 43 (October
30, 1971), p. 2217.
3i bid.
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on us as a part of the U.N. process."^
Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat from Arkansas, expressed
a somewhat d iffe re n t opinion:
I do not think what happened should be held
against the U. N. as an in s titu tio n . I t was
not the individual members who voted against us.
Many of them have been giving large sums of
money.
Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, was quick to
demand a United States withdrawal from the United Nations.

He added:

My only regret was that my country had not joined
the representative from Taiwan in walking out on a
session so farcical that i t defies description.^
Senator Edward Kennedy, Democrat from Massachusetts, said:
For the f i r s t
a ll the major
in the U.N. .
than the loss
embrace these

time in nearly a quarter of a century
powers of the world are represented
. I t would be a tragedy fa r greater
of Taiwan for the U. S. to f a il to
opportunities.4

Senator James L. Buckley of New York announced that he was
drafting legislatio n "to delete a provision to the foreign aid
authorization, a b ill repealing the Formosa Resolution of 1955."
That resolution authorized the President to use armed force to protect
5
Nationalist China against armed attack.

^"China and the UN:
op. c i t . , p. 2217.

Threats of Retaliation in Congress,"

^ibid.
^ibid.
^ibid.
5ib id .
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The e ffe c t of Peking's admission on the United Nations
China's entry brought many changes in the United Nations.
The London Times on October 26, 1971 quoted French Defense
Minister Michel Debre as saying that the China vote marked the end
of the period in which the two superpowers, the United States and
the Soviet Union, dominated world a ffa irs and could se ttle in te r
national disputes among themselves.
Nationalist China paid its regular budget dues on the basis
of the total population of China, mainland as well as Taiwan.

At

the Nationalist ouster, the representatives of th eir government
walked out owing 30.3 m illion dollars.

They had always paid up th eir

dues even at the la s t possible moment.
Taiwan's expulsion:

A dangerous precedent

United Nations diplomats were concerned by a country of
good standing being expelled.

I f i t could happen to Taiwan, i t could

happen to Israel or in fact any country small or large.
Aside from the angry response from some diplomats, lawmakers,
and people which was by no means unanimous, President Nixon was faced
with two d if f ic u lt problems a fte r the Assembly vote that gave
the People's Republic the seat in the United Nations that had been
occupied by Taiwan.

The problems were (1) the Mutual Defense Treaty,

a m ilita ry commitment signed by the United States as well as Taiwan
December 2, 1954 and (2) Washington's future diplomatic relations
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with N ationalist ChinaJ
The c ritic a l reaction of many members of both the United
States government and the United Nations following the expulsion
of Taiwan made i t even more d if f ic u lt for the President's diplomatic
dealings with both the Communist regime in China and the Chinese
Nationalists on Taiwan.
Background considerations fo r the February 1972 Sino-American Summit
Before he was elected vice-president in 1952, Richard M.
Nixon graduated from W hittier College, took a law degree from Duke
University, served in Congress (1946-1951), and represented
C alifornia as senator (1951-1953).

He was a staunch anti-Communist

and was vigorous up to at least 1960 in warning against any pander
ing to the "international criminals" in Peking.

This was his theme

in many a speech directed at Senator John F. Kennedy as the two men
vied for the presidency.
Loser in the 1960 election, Mr. Nixon turned to law, often
traveling in Asia on behalf of c lien ts.

I t may have changed his

views about the Mao Tse-tung regime in Peking.

As early as 1967,

he was considering a trip to Communist China with the Prime Minister
of Newfoundland and Labrador, and w riting in Foreign Affairs in 1968
that China should not remain forever isolated from American contact.

^"Taiwan Regime:

Major Obstacle to US-Peking Ties," op. c it .

p. 2340.
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Nixon's China trip was an important step in the development
of Sino-American relations.

Of course at this time neither China

nor the United States formally recognized the other.
they had been involved in numerous crises.

Since 1949

Each labeled the other

as an "aggressor"; each had created an image of the other as the
monster incapable of rational action.

Washington continued diplomatic

relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, which Peking con
sidered a rebellious province.
Many Americans who supported the Nationalists on Taiwan
wondered how Nixon with his antirCommunist background could negotiate
with the hated Chinese Communists.

Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott

summed up the feelings of many July 12, 1971 when he commented on
ABC's Issues and Answers:
A Republican President. . .can often do things
in foreign policy a Democrat c a n 't, for good
reason. Had the Democratic Presidents moved
toward this rapprochement with Mainland China,
people in this country, led by many Republicans,
would s t i l l be seeing Communists under the bed
and would have raised pluperfect h e ll.
World p o litic s had undergone a radical change since the 1950s.
The tr ip of 20,395 miles, Nixon said, "w ill signal the end of a
s te rile and barren interlude in the relationship between two great
peoples."

I t was unrealistic for the United States not to have

formal diplomatic relations with the most populous nation in the world.
There were a number of advantages for renewed Sino-American contact
a fte r so many years.

F irs t, American recognition of China, due to

the Si no-Soviet s p lit , would enable the United States to play o ff the
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two Communist giants against one another.

And of course the American

business community fantasized about the great China market.

Because

the American economy was in a recession in the early 1970s trade with
China was a possible source of r e lie f .

Another reason fo r Nixon's

China tr ip was that China possessed nuclear weapons and was not a
member of any international an tip ro life ra tio n arrangements.

Soviet-

American nuclear arms control agreements were not complete without
Chinese participation.

Nixon also hoped that American recognition

of China would encourage Peking to reduce its aid to North Vietnam
and help to bring about a p o litic a l settlement.
The China tr ip would also hopefully benefit Nixon for his
bid at reelection in 1972.

Also the f ir s t presidential primary for

1972 was in March of that year.

This would follow close upon the

heels of the Nixon tr ip to China.

For a number o f years lib era l

Americans had urged relations with China; Democrats were loud in
th e ir praise of the China t r ip .

Nixon, with a proven anti-Communist

record, could not be accused by the Republican rig h t of being soft on
Communism.

Perhaps the most v ita l reason for Nixon's Peking Trip

was the contribution that this tr ip would make in the Nixon-Kissinger
policy of "detente"— the relaxation of international tensions to
protect American global interests.
On th e ir part the Chinese had th e ir own reasons fo r inviting
Nixon.

They no longer perceived that the United States was the

greatest m ilita ry threat to them.
worsened since 1968.

Si no-Soviet relations had seriously

The Ussuri border incident occurred in March

1969, plus numerous other border skirmishes over the years.
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the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Chinese feared
that the same thing could happen to them.

The Soviet Union had

erected an a ir base in Mongolia; in response the Chinese had dug
a ir-ra id shelters and tunnel networks.

I t was hoped that the new

American connection would strengthen China vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
In addition China viewed rising Japanese power with caution.

A

Sino-American rapprochement would cause Japan to think twice before
attempting to assert hegemony over the People's Republic.

Of course

i t was also possible that a new Sino-Japanese positive relationship
would strengthen China in its dealings with the Soviets.

Fin ally,

but not least in importance, China wanted the United States out
of Taiwan; and she was also interested in trade.
The Nixon Peking Trip
In his excellent book China and the United States What Next?
Allen S. Whiting asks:

"Was the Mixon tr ip as historic an event

in retrospect as i t appeared at the time?"

The author la te r answered

this question by saying:
. . .the 1972 China tr ip was both symbolic and
substantive. The Mao-Nixon handshake communicated
a recognition by both leaders that Sino-American
relations had moved from nadir of war and near
war to near normalcy where interests could converge
and compromise be negotiated.
After more than twenty years of noncommunication i t would
seem doubtful that any Chinese or American would wish to omit that
important meeting from the pages of history.
Nixon hoped that friendly diplomatic relations could be
established between Peking and the United States and that this policy
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would reestablish direct contact.

The leaders of the two countries

could then reconsider, and hopefully improve b ila te ral relations.
The newly elected President's pre-election doctrine and
slogan had been "No more Vietnams" and an "honorable" peace in
Vietnam.

He promised, i f elected, to put an end to the longest

war in which Americans had been involved.

When the Eisenhower,

Kennedy and Johnson Administrations committed the United States to
the defense of South Vietnam they did not realize the determination
and strength of North Vietnam, nor that the United States participation
in the war would take the lives of over 56,000 American men.

The

United States taxpayers continue to pay over $200 b illio n in veterans
benefi ts .
After being elected to the Presidency, Nixon immediately began
his campaign to end the war in Vietnam and to terminate American
involvement in the area as rapidly as possible.
and steps he offered were:

Among other proposals

a program for the mutual withdrawal of

American and North Vietnamese troops; a ceasefire; a change of b a ttle 
fie ld orders from "maximum pressure" on the enemy to "protective
reaction" in order to lower the casualty rate; a number of sizeable
troop withdrawals amounting to 110,000 by early 1970, at which time
a further reduction of 150,000 by the spring of 1971 was announced
(the over-all rate being 12,000 per month) a speeding up of the
"Vietnamization" program, that is , the training of South Vietnamese
forces to take over an increasingly larger share of the fighting.
Hanoi and the Viet Cong believed that i f they waited long enough
American opinion would weary of the war and that they would win in
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the c o n flic t.

S t ill determined to liberate the United States from

its m ilita ry involvement in Vietnam, Nixon decided to request an
interview with Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the People's Republic of
China.

The President hoped that Mao would convince North Vietnam

to cooperate in ending the hopeless struggle.
July 15, 1971, President Nixon had announced that he would
v is it Peking in early 1972 "to seek the normalization of relations
between the Peoples Republic of China and the United States of
America."

The meeting had been arranged by Secretary of State Henry

Kissinger at a secret meeting.
February 21, 1972 President and Mrs. Nixon arrived at Peking.
Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China stood waiting
a t the foot of the stairs of the Nixon plane "S p irit of '76."

After

shaking of hands with the President and Mrs. Nixon, Chou welcomed
Kissinger as "Old friend ."

The customary speeches were omitted but

the People's Liberation Army Band honored both nations with the
American National Anthem, the Star Spangled Banner and the Chinese
Anthem March of the Volunteers.
The ice was broken and the leading characters were on th e ir
way to Peking.
A short time a fte r arriving at the guest house, the President,
Premier Chou En-lai and Henry Kissinger met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
They were warmly received and talked earnestly for an hour.
The Americans were dinner guests in the Great Hall of the
People that evening.

The following day the leaders from the two

countries met to establish harmonious relations.

The rapprochement
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in Sino-American relations achieved at that time was considered by
Robert G. Sutter in his excellent book China-Watch to mark "the most
important breakthrough in modern Chinese foreign policy."
The factors discussed at the f i r s t meeting were of concern
to both parties though obviously fo r differen t reasons.
The "question of Taiwan" was no doubt one of the most
d if f ic u lt problems to solve.

I t was fin a lly acceptable to the leaders

of the People's Republic and the United States to agree "that there
is but one China and Taiwan is a part of i t . "
The United States pledged to ultim ately withdraw its m ilitary
troops from that location.
Reducing the dangers of a major m ilita ry co n flict between
the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union was next on the
agenda.

Since 1959 the Soviets and the Chinese have engaged in

border h o s tilitie s .

China s t i l l fears a Soviet strik e on her nuclear

installations and missile sites.

Normalizing Sino-American relations,

strengthening alliances, and preparedness were the suggestions given
to meet the problem.
Nixon did not hesitate in asking the Chinese leaders for
suggestions and aid in extricating the United States from its
m ilita ry involvement in Vietnam.

He hoped that they would encourage

a peaceful settlement to the c o n flic t.
The Shanghai Communique
On February 27, 1972 a fte r much Sino-American disagreement,
a jo in t communique was issued.

The essence of the document pointed
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out that the Chinese and the Americans had agreed to disagree.
Communique contained three main sections:

The

one that stated agreed

positions, another presented the Chinese positions, the other
explained the American positions.
Dealing with the general principles to govern b ila teral
Sino-American relations, the two sides agreed:

There was to be

further progress toward "normalization" (which was not defined),
including an expansion of s c ie n tific and cultural exchange and
trade.

Sino-American relations were to be based on the "five

principles of peaceful coexistence" (these principles were not
labeled as such).

The two parties agreed to remain in contact with

each other.
The Chinese maintained that Taiwan was the "crucial question
obstructing the normalization of relations" between the People's
Republic of China and the United States.

The Chinese also stressed

that Taiwan was a province of China and that no one could legitim ately
in terfere with its "liberatio n"; that American troops and bases
must be withdrawn from the island (no time lim it was specified); and
that no separate status of any kind fo r Taiwan was permissible.

The

American side stated that i t did not "challenge" this position, which
i t attributed to a ll Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan S tra it,
that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of i t .

The United

States pushed for a peaceful settlement on the two parties involved.
She made its m ilita ry withdrawal conditional on China's good behavior
not only in the Taiwan S tra it but in the rest of Asia, as well as on
the general growth of international s ta b ility in the region.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TOO

The communique also dealt with a number of third states.
The Americans stated that they wanted peace in Asia, with "social
progress for a ll peoples. . . free of outside pressure or in te r
vention."

The communique stressed that these words applied to

Vietnam, from which the United States planned to withdraw a fte r a
negotiated settlement.

The United States furthermore would maintain

friend ly relations with South Korea and Japan.

The Chinese stated

that they would continue to support "the struggles of a ll oppressed
people" against large nations which attempt to "bully" the small.
All foreign troops should be withdrawn from Asia, especially Vietnam.
Both parties agreed that "neither should seek hegemony in the AsiaPacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country
or group of nations to establish such hegemony."

This last provision

was directed at the Soviet Union.
Finally both sides called for increased cultural and
commercial contacts.

On the seventh day of his China t r ip , February

28, 1972, Nixon commented that "this was the week that changed the
world."
The following is an excerpt from the President's Speech on
his Return Home, February 28, 1972.
When I announced this tr ip .la s t July, I
described i t as a journey for peace. In the
la s t th irty years Americans have in three d iffe r 
ent wars gone o ff in the hundreds of thousands
to fig h t and some to die, in Asia and in the Pacific.
One of the central motives behind my journey to
China was to prevent that from happening a fourth
time to another generation of Americans.
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. . .We have demonstrated that nations with very
deep and fundamental differences can learn to
discuss those differences calmly, ratio n a lly , and
frankly without compromising th e ir principles.
This is the basis of a structure for peace where
we can talk about differences rather than fig h t
about them.
The primary goal of this tr ip was to reestablish
communication with the People's Republic of China
a fte r a generation of h o s tility . We achieved that
goal 1
But peace, peace is too urgent to wait for centuries.
We must seize the moment to move toward that goal
now, and this is what we have done on this journey.1
The shock waves from this new Sino-American meeting were
f e l t in Tokyo, Taipei, Saigon, New Delhi and Moscow.
The Peking summit and the Shanghai Communique did not change
the world, as Nixon had stated, but these events had established the
foundation for eventual Sino-American diplomatic relations.

Yet the

fact that the tr ip took place at a ll and that the Chinese received
Nixon with courtesy and respect cannot be disregarded.

Also the

Chinese permitted more Westerners to see more of China in a shorter
period of time than would have been permitted prior to the Nixon v is it.
On the American side Nixon came up with a formula involving terms of
reference regarding Taiwan d iffere n t than in the past which made i t
possible to define a lim ited agreement with China a fte r twenty years
of h o s tility and confrontation.

This event ended the decade of stale

mate in Chinese-American relations.

Real communication was in itia te d

with China.

York:

^Wilson, Richard, Ed. The President's Trip to China (New
A National General Company, 1972), pp. 156-57.
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According to an a rtic le en titled "Foreign Relations" in
the Far Eastern Economic Review 1971 Yearbook:
Nixon's long standing game plan for drawing
China onto the world stage, lik e sim ilar and
related moves by de Gaulle and Trudeau, and
others, were motivated largely by internal
p o litic s , for a settlement in Indochina and a
b e lie f that Peking could be helpful in that
regard i f i t would, as well as by the need for
leverage to offset the growing m ilita ry threat
of Russia and the economic threat of Japan.
Regarding continued United States' involvement in Southeast Asia J. W.
Fulbright, then Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the
United States Senate stated:
. . . may I say that I personally feel that our
continuing involvement in Southeast Asia is the
most serious threat to the survival of our
Constitutional system of which we have been so
proud. . .

• r-

I feel that we are very gravely threatened by
disillusionment on the part of many people about
the v a lid ity of our basic society. .
After signing the Shanghai Communique, Peking and the United

States began a period of testing and exploring.
markedly increased.

B ilateral trade

"Contrary to the conservative forecasts of

experts, trade soared from $100 m illion in 1972 to $800 m illion in
1973 and reached $934 m illion in 1974."^
Lai son offices were established in both Peking and Washington.
These offices- provided a direct means of communication between the

"China and the U. S.: Today and Yesterday," Hearings
before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 92nd
Congress, February 7 and 8, 1972, p. 7.
York:

^Whiting, Allen S. China and the U.S.: What Next?
Foreign Policy Association, 1976), pp. 18-19.
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two states.

Confidential talks at the highest level between Mao

and Kissinger continued un til the resignation of Richard M. Nixon
in 1974.
Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente
During the Nixon Presidency from 1969-1974 the Cold War was
lim ited through a policy of detente with the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China.

This was a radical change from the

trad ition al United States' policy of containing Communism which had
originated during the administration o f Harry Truman and had been
pursued by succeeding presidents through the Johnson years.

Americans

fin a lly realized from hard b itte r experience that monolithic Communism
no longer e x is te d --if i t ever had in the f ir s t place.
world was the new re a lity .

The multipolar

Detente was the current American policy

of containing nationalism and revolution.

I t was the keystone of

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's (national security a ffa irs adviser, 1969-1973,
and secretary of state, 1973-1977) foreign policy.
Dr. Kissinger interpreted the configuration of world a ffa irs ,
. . .there were five power centers: Russia, America,
China, Japan, the Common Market nations of Western
Europe. Each had a responsibility to keep order in
its region and not to intrude in areas dominated by
the others. In this way, small nations could no
longer play o ff one great power against another and
could not count on outside help. In essence, the
scheme presumed to grant the United States more
freedom and f le x ib ilit y in its diplomacy. . . This
fiv e way balance of power would also permit the
United States to contain both Russia and China at
the same time by having them contain each other.
The Sino-Soviet s p lit was a r e a lity Americans now
recognized and welcomed.
Detente was also a
cheaper way of pursuing the containment doctrine;
i t did not require as many interventions or weapons

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104

expenditures (Nixon reduced the armed forces from
3.5 m illion in 1968 to 2.3 m illion in 1973 and
ended the d r a f t ) .1
Kissinger goes on to emphasize that peace in Asia is crucial to
global peace and that the balance of power in Asia in flu id .
focal pointof the power struggle

The

in Asia is not only between East

and West but between the two major communist powers also.

The

United States' security relationship with China is crucial fo r the
global balance of power.
The process of detente could thus not be complete unless
the United States developed a working relationship with the People's
Republic of China.

The foundation for diplomatic relations between

the United States and the People's Republic in January 1979 was laid
by the implementation of the Nixon-Kissinger concept of detente.

C liffo rd , J. Garry, Hagan, Kenneth J ., and Paterson, Thomas
G. American Foreign Policy: A History (Lexington: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1977), p. 576.
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CHAPTER IV

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHANGED CHINA POLICY
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the United
States China policy has been implemented during the Ford and Carter
administrations.

The changed China policy was o f fic ia lly carried

out in January 1979 when the United States and the People's Republic
of China established fu ll diplomatic relations with each other--some
c ritic s would say that this event took place th irty years too la te .
The Ford Years 1974-1976
Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai gave every
indication that they admired President Nixon who had travelled
20,395 miles and humbled himself by asking advice and assistance
fo r his country from leaders of an unfriendly nation.

Nixon quoted

Chairman Mao on television:
So many deeds cry out to be done and always
urgently. The world ro lls on. Time passes.
Seize the day. Seize the hour. We w ill build
a bridge across 16,000 miles and 22 years of
h o s tility J
I t is now important to address ourselves to the question
of why Ford and Kissinger fa ile d to fu lly implement the new China

Republic.

^Hughes, Thomas L. "Who Lost Our China Policy?"
February 28, 1976, p. 20.

The New
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policy by establishing diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China.

The Ford/Kissinger China policy was in essence

a do nothing approach to China.

Why would Kissinger, who along with

former President Nixon had set the foundation for eventual diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic, and Ford f a il to complete the
process toward diplomatic relations between the two nations?
Four months a fte r the Nixon v is it to Peking and the formal
signing of the Shanghai Communique, former House Majority Leader Hale
Boggs and House Minority Leader Gerald Ford of the United States
House of Representatives were sent on a Mission to the People's
Republic of China.

Their Joint Report to the Speaker of the House of

Representatives says:
Dear Mr. Speaker: Transmitted herewith is a
report of our recent journey to the People's
Republic of China. Nearly one quarter of a ll
mankind is Chinese. Together our populations
total more than 1 b illio n individuals. Yet, over
nearly 23 years, we risked potentially dangerous
misunderstandings as our nations became ever more
isolated one from the other. We hope. . . in
p a rtic u la r, that our journey w ill contribute in
a small way to a normalization of US relations
with China.'
After signing the Shanghai Communique with President Nixon,
Chairman Mao Tse-tung anticipated an early v is it from Nixon's
successor Gerald R. Ford.

After waiting much longer than expected,

the leaders of the People's Republic were shocked and angry when they
learned through the news media that a Ford-Brezhnev suiranit meeting

1i bi d.
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was being held at Vladivostok.

The preference shown the Soviets, plus

the location, a former Chinese te rrito ry , caused Mao to wonder ju st
how fa r Kissinger's friendship went.

After a l l , Kissinger had been

the one who had made arrangements for the Nixon meeting.
I t was not un til one year la te r that President Ford met with
the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

The United States

had been experiencing a d if f ic u lt time in its foreign a ffa irs .

In

the spring of 1975 the United States supported Indochinese regimes
of South Vietnam and Cambodia collapsed.

The leadership c ris is

stemming from the Watergate scandal and economic recession had
obviously caused Ford's long delay in paying respects to Peking.
The People's Republic of China no doubt had expected the
United States to eventually withdraw from Vietnam, but the precipitious
American departure had serious consequences for them regarding Taiwan.
The American defeats in Vietnam caused the Chinese leaders
to cast some doubt on promises of the Shanghai Communique— they had
expected the United States to serve as a m ilitary guarantee for the
People's Republic against the Soviets.

This new situation following

the American withdrawal from Indochina altered the Chinese leaderships'
perception of the balance of power.

They did not look with favor on

American withdrawal from the region at that particular time.
The Chinese were not prepared to a lte r the relationship with
Washington, but were worried over the friendship that seemed evident
between the United States and the Soviet Union along with the weakened
condition of the Americans.

They also resented Ford's dismissal of
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Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger whom they considered to be
a friend of China.
I t was not un til December 1, 1975 that the Fords arrived
in China.

" L ittle seems to have been accomplished.

President Ford

supposedly spent some of his time in Peking working on his budget."^
A fter the departure of the President's party, Vice Premier Teng was
said to have remarked that they had witnessed a new style of negotia
tions, "not even a communique."
On his return tr ip to the United States the President
stopped b rie fly at Indonesia, the Philippines and Hawaii where he
announced his Pacific Doctrine which reaffirmed the desire of the
United States to "normalize" Sino-American relations.
Lack of interest in promoting a frien d ly relationship between
the two countries was obvious at the time.

George Bush, head of the

United States Laison Office in Peking, was called home in December
1975 to become Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

There was

no replacement made in the Peking Laison o ffic e u n til March- 1976 when
President Ford announced his choice of Thomas S. Green.

p

The Carter Administration
The 1976 Presidential campaign was described by the out
standing columnist James Reston as "The Great Nondebate."

^Hinton, Harold C. Peking-Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy
and the United States (Washington, D.C.: The Center fo r Strategic and
International Studies, 1976), pp. 63-64.
2ib id .
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The 1976 election of Jimmy Carter over Republican
candidate Gerald Ford did not signal significant
changes in American Foreign policy.
A few of the Carter campaign pledges to the American
people were: "nonmilitary solutions to international
problems; cut back U.S. arms sales abroad which had
totaled $20 b illio n in 1976; curb the covert
a c tiv itie s of the CIA; cooperate with Congress;,
reduce secrecy in the making of foreign policy.
One hour before President Carter delivered his television
announcement December 15, 1978 regarding the establishment of diplo
matic relations between the United States and the People's Republic
of China, he calmly met with Congressional leaders and informed them
that a Joint Communique had been signed by the People's Republic of
China and the United States of America and that they would recognize
each other
sadors

January 1, 1979.

At that

and establish embassies March

time they

would exchange ambas

6, 1979.

He explained that the

announcement meant that the United States would withdraw its recognition
of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and would terminate its mutual defense
treaty with that nation at the end of 1979.
A rtic le 10 of the Mutual Defense Treaty emphasizes that
either party can terminate the pact with one year's notice.

The

United States would then withdraw its remaining 753 noncombat troops
from Taiwan.^
Normalization—and the expanded commercial and
cultural relations that i t w ill bring—w ill con
trib u te to the well-being of our own nation, to

C liffo rd , J. Garry, Hagan, Kenneth, and Paterson, Thomas
G. American Foreign Policy: A History (Lexington, Mass.: D.C.
Heath and Company, 1977), p. 600.
2

"China Policy: Shift from Taiwan to Peking." Congres
sional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 36 (December 23, 1978), p. 3489.
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our national interest and i t w ill enhance the
s ta b ility of Asia.1
I f a bomb had suddenly exploded in the room the members of
Congress could not have been more startled nor surprised.

They were

aware of this pending explosive issue but took for granted that the
President would consult with them before changing the state of the
Taiwan treaty.

Some conservative members decided to block the

termination of the Taiwan defense treaty by introducing a jo in t
resolution condemning Carter's action and n u llifyin g the termination
of the tre a ty.

Representative Lester L. Wolff, Democrat, New York,

Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific A ffairs
commented on the manner in which the termination was transacted.
He warned the congressional members that i t "raises serious concerns
that we have returned to the era of secret agreements concluded
prim arily for the purpose of avoiding rigorous debate in Congress
on the merits of the issues involved."

2

Senator Alan Cranston, Democrat, C alifornia, the Democratic
Whip, along with other Senate liberals praised Carter and joined
Cranston, who said:

"Carter's courageous decision is a positive step

forward to world peace."

Jan K alicki, foreign a ffa irs aide to

Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat, Massachusetts, expressed the
opinion a fte r reading an amendment that resulted a fte r a series
of compromises.

"This simply says that the President should consult

1ibid .
2

loc. c i t . , p. 3490.

^i bi d.
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with Congress.

Who can be against that?"^

Senate Minority Leader Howard H. Baker, J r ., Republican,
Tennessee, opposed the treaty.

He requested the postponement of

the cancellation of the Taiwan defense treaty until Congress could
consider that action.

"Time must be given for Congress to deal with
2
such an important foreign policy matter," he said.
Representative Robert E. Bauman, Republican, Maryland, and

other members of the American Conservative Union decided to introduce
a jo in t resolution condemning Carter's action and n u llify in g the
termination of the treaty although the resolution would be vetoed by
President Carter i f passed by the House and Senate.

Congressman

Bauman responded to a remark that suggested that most Americans
were in d ifferen t to the problem by saying, "I think this is a lo t
more emotional than most people rea lize .
we've thrown an a lly out the window."

This is the f ir s t time

3

Senator Barry Goldwater, Republican, Arizona, was determined
to le t the court decide the con stitutionality of the defense treaty
and jo in t communique.

Administration and State Department o ffic ia ls ,

however, did not agree with Senator Goldwater.
President Jimmy Carter defiantly insisted:

"My constitu

tional responsibility in establishing relationships with foreign
countries is clear and cannot be successfully challenged in court.

^ibi d.
^ibid.
3 ibid.

^ibid.
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The evening of December 15, 1978 was one that President
Jimmy Carter w ill no doubt long remember.

He le f t the Congressmen

and at 9 P.M. spoke from the Oval Office at the White House.

The

address was broadcast liv e on radio and television (see Appendix A).
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing was given a royal welcome
when he arrived in Washington.

The usual two audiences at the most

with the President were increased to three.
Teng and party were entertained at a banquet.

The Vice Premier, Mrs.
Among the guests

were former President Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger and Richard M.
Nixon who had made possible the obvious friendly relationship seen
by television viewers throughout the world.
A je t was placed at the Vice Premier's disposal to take him
wherever he wished in the United States.
places of interest that he toured were:

Among some of the v ita l
farms, coal mining regions,

o il exploration areas and machine plants (See Appendix B).
William V. Roth, J r ., United States Senator from Delaware,
speaking on the subject "New Perspectives on Our Relations with China
and the Soviet Union," February 1, 1979 said:
Today, in the midst of Chinese Vice President
Teng Hsiao-ping's v is it to the United States,
I believe there is a need for some sober and
re a lis tic thinking—thinking about China, about
China’ s relations with the United States, and about
the triangular relationship between China, the
Soviet Union, and the United States.
The events in China are fast moving and very
exciting. . .normalization is an accomplished
fact. I t should not be reversed. I have supported
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normalization of relations with Peking
although on d iffe re n t terms. . J
Senator Roth agreed that i t was time to meet and discuss
matters of importance to both China and the United States, but he
c ritic iz e d the President's lack of consideration for our Chinese
Nationalist friends and a llie s .

Cooperation with Congress and the

promise to reduce secrecy in the making of foreign policy were two
of President Jimmy Carter's campaign pledges during the 1976 election.
Other a llie s of the'United States were no doubt perturbed and won
dered i f th e ir commitments could be counted upon.
Many American merchants and ind ustrialists were concentrating
on the huge potention market of over 900,000,000 prospective buyers.
I t was China's trading port doors that opened fo r the United States
and made i t possible for the new Republic to enter the commercial world
in 1784.

Long before the Manchus' invasion China had been visited by

traders from the known world as she had the reputation of being the
"Hub of C iv iliz a tio n ."
Evolving Sino-American Relations
After former President Nixon opened the door to Sino-American
relations in 1972, the council was established in 1973 to promote
trade between China and the United States.

I t works closely with the

China Council fo r the promotion of International Trade, its counter
part in China.

^Roth, William, V ., J r ., "New Perspectives on Our Relations
with China and the Soviet Union." V ital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XLV,
March 15, 1979, pp. 322-323.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114

Normalization of relations between China and the United
States have greatly improved since former Treasury Secretary
Michael BlumenthaVs mission to China in March 1979.

His mission

was to set up a framework fo r expanded economic relations and
financial arrangements.
Two obstacles to effective Sino-American relations were
discussed:

settlement of claims for American property confiscated

a fte r the Communists seized power in China; and fa ilu re of the United
States to accord China most-favored-nation status fo r its exports
to this country.
Secretary Blumenthal and his eleven-man team negotiated
for nine days to establish a groundwork for a wide-ranging trade
agreement between the two nations.
achieved.

The purpose of the mission was

A jo in t economic committee was in place, and one particu

la rly troublesome barrier to Sino-American trade had been removed
a fte r three decades of dispute, the two sides agreed to a settlement
of claims seized by the Communists.

Among the companies were Exxon

Corporation, International Telephone and Telegraph, and General
E lectric Company.
As in the period of imperialism in China, the United States
has been late in arriving .

Merchants from the former "Powers" in 

cluding Great B rita in , France, Japan and West Germany, have a heads ta rt in trade.

But now the United States and China have better

communication trade w ill catch up with the American competitors.
But for a ll the apparent success of the Blumenthal Mission,
financial experts predict that i t w ill take many years to develop
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the potential of that market.

An a rtic le en titled "China:

Really

A Bonanza for U. S. Business" ( U. S. News and World Report, January
8, 1979) outlines a ll that can be re a lis tic a lly expected in the next
few years.
A sign ifican t—but not immediate spectacular—
expansion of U.S. trade with Peking. Opening
of offices in China by a few U.S. companies, and
a s ta rt on jo in t Chinese-American business
ventures.
A sizeable increase in the two-way flow of
technicians, business people, o ffic ia ls and
students between the United States and China.
A speedup in some of China's top p rio rity
development programs especially in o il and
agriculture.
Vice Premier Teng's goal, however, is to transform China into
a modern industrial nation by the year 2000.

Peking has drawn up a

domestic development program—as a housewife would a budget—that
calls fo r spending a d e fin ite amount.

Modernization includes agricul

ture, industry, defense and science.

Being well supplied with natural

resources which include tungsten, iron, antimony, coal, petroleum,
and main industries of s tee l, e le c tric itie s , machinery, o il and
coal, Premier Teng may achieve his dream.
with China's economy—that is o il.

One resource could go far

I t is estimated by Harrison that

"China w ill attain a production of 400 m illion tons of o il, about 8
m illion barrels a day by 1990 through the exploitation of existing
fields and the s t i l l untapped eastern China Sea resources."1

1Middleton, Drew. The Duel of the Giants:
China and Russia
in Asia (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), p. 70.
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The Peking government is quietly making progress toward the
status of a major nuclear power.

Naturally its presumed objective

is to possess as soon as possible deterrent against its potential
nuclear enemy the Soviet Union.
There is no way that the many huge a ir-ra id shelters in
China can be concealed.
rural d is tric ts .

They are dug under c itie s and in the remote

Drew Middleton describes the system of tunnels

in his informative book, Duel of the Giants.

At least half a m illion

workers in China's factories, shops and farms devote or have given
time to create these unbelievable ventilated shelters.

Due to a lack

of modern machinery, the workers used shovels, picks, primary tools
and wheelbarrows.

The shelters contain water reservoirs, storage

compartments for grain and ric e .

They are divided into sections for

f ir s t aid, schools, dormatories and even barberships.

An enormous

m ilitia has been and continues to be trained to defend the shelters.
Chinese naval a c tiv ity has sharply increased along with the
army.

"M ilitary spending is now estimated at 9 to 10 per cent of

the gross national product."^
The United States army, navy and other armed services a fte r
a long period of waiting are fin a lly receiving the weapons they
sought.
1980s.

Tanks and surface-to-air missiles w ill be arriving in the
I t is improbable that the United States government would

leave China insecure in these turbulent times, by sharing th e ir
m ilita ry supplies with another nation.
In the event of a Si no-Soviet war, the impact on the United

^loc. c i t . , p. 16.
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States would be tremendous, especially without fu ll protection.
Drew Middleton comments, "History w ill ask the questions.

America

w ill have to answer them."
Vice President Walter Mondale's late August 1979 o ffic ia l
v is it to China strengthened the United States' relationship with
Peking.

Before leaving Peking he gave the leaders of the People's

Republic of China a parting g if t , an attractive p o litic a l and economic
package.
The major elements:
An im p licit U.S. warning to Russia, Peking's
ideological foe that any attempt to weaken or
isolate China contradicts basic American interests.
An exchange of v is its early next year between
President Carter and Chinese Communist Party
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng.
A pledge by the Carter administration to arrange
2 b illio n dollars in American commercial credits
to accelerate trade, plus an offer of technological
help to build hydroelectric plants.'
Included in his campaign pledges President Carter "indicating
that he

was influenced by lessons from the past, pledged he would seek

nonmilitary

solutions to international problems."

Even so, his

"nonmilitary solutions" add to the United States taxpayers a staggering
burden.

Many do not complain, however, as long as i t does not take

the lives of American youth.
At a meeting with the United States Senators during his
Washington v is it in January 1979, Vice Premier Teng suggested and
encouraged a strong presence of the United States in Asia.

A number

^Wallace, J ., "Mondale Offers More Carrots to Peking."
States News and World Report, September 10, 1979, p. 53.
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Uni ted

of senators were not impressed a fte r the United States made such
huge miscalculations with Japan, Israel and Iran.

The Vice Premier

also assured his listeners that Peking looked forward to a peaceful
readjustment with Taiwan, whose "re a litie s would be fu lly respected.

^Roth, op. c i t . , p. 324.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
The President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, and
Chairman Mao Tse-tung met in Peking February 27, 1972 and decided
to lay aside past h o s tilitie s and put forth every e ffo rt to cooperate
for the security of th e ir nations.

I t was obvious to both leaders

that this step was in the interest of both countries.

On January

1, 1979 the two governments fin a lly established diplomatic relations.
During the 1960s the Chinese leadership was inward looking
regarding foreign policy.

In the 1970s Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and

th e ir successors Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping have attempted to
normalize the People's Republic of China a fte r the chaos of the
Cultural Revolution.

The People's Republic of China is no longer

the "sick man of Asia."

The intense Si no-Soviet border clashes of

the 1960s which culminated in the March 1969 border incidents pre
cipitated the Sino-American rapprochement.

China began to see that

the world balance of powei— particu larly the situation in Asia—was
changing.

The Chinese regime saw that the United States was reducing

its commitments in Asia; specifically the American withdrawal from
Vietnam which was completed by 1973.
For China 1976 was another watershed year.

In January

Chou En-lai died; Hua Kuo-feng was appointed Premier in February;
119
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Mao died in September followed in October by Hua being formally
accepted as Party Chairman and the so called "Gang of Four" purged.
Under the guidance of Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping the
People's Republic is pursuing the goal of modernization with the
fin a l targets set for the year 2000.

In pursuit of this goal we

need to understand what modernization in China e n tails.
is a need for increased consumer goods.
for national security.

F irs t, there

Secondly, there is a concern

Chinese radicals feel that the f ir s t p rio rity

should be to sort out social and p o litic a l problems; whereas the
pragmatists, represented by Teng Hsiao-ping, advocate establishing
a solid economic base before dealing with social problems.
The question to which we need to address ourselves concerns:
Is China's program of modernization attempting too much too fast?
Some experts feel that this proposed growth w ill be too much for the
Chinese society to absorb.

Personally, I would advocate a more

incremental approach for China.
China's foreign policy today is more open than Mao's China
of the 1960s; China is indeed joining the world family of nations,
and she is becoming a more cooperative partner in the community of
nations.

During the early 1979 invasion of Vietnam, China was

reasserting herself as a regional Asian power.
We cannot overlook that for over one hundred years—from
the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century—China was a passive
en tity in international relations.

Mao, upon assuming power in 1949,

began to reestablish control over China's te rrito ry and borders.
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In 1971 the Sino-American relationship became a re a lity
beginning with the Ping Pong diplomacy in 1971 followed in February
1972 with Nixon's China t r ip .

During the 1970s Americans began to

travel in increasing numbers to the Mainland.

On December 15, 1978

President Carter announced that the United States would establish
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

The haste

with which Carter extended diplomatic recognition to the People's
Republic, without f i r s t consulting with such a llie s as Japan or
Taiwan regarding the new state of a ffa irs , was harmful to the world's
perception of American r e lia b ilit y as an a lly .

Early in 1979 Vice

Premier Teng Hsiao-ping visited the United States to help secure and
expand the new Sino-American relationship.

I t should be remembered

that during the 1960s, due to the Vietnam War, the United States and
China were on a dangerous collision course.

The 1969 border incidents

put the Soviet and Chinese relationship on an equally precarious basis.
How can the United States deal with China in terms of big
power relations?

She must either balance the Soviet Union and China

or lean toward China.
The Chinese leadership must take into account while pursuing
policy objectives its people's desire and need of personal security
and the urgent requirement for economic development.
With the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
People's Republic of China and the United States, the two states
had gone from detente to fu ll diplomatic relations.
The Chinese considerations included the following reasons:
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F irs t, the government of the People's Republic of China
was concerned with the security of th e ir nation in relation to the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The leadership believed that

they were being encircled by the Soviets on the north and India on
the west.

Secondly, they had p o litic a l motives for pursuing a new

relationship with the United States.

Their p o litic a l plans comple

mented th e ir economic needs for development.

In order to achieve

th e ir goals of modernization, they needed the technological and
financial assistance which the Soviet Union was no longer w illin g to
grant them.

Their aims were rendered somewhat contradictory by th eir

desire fo r establishing correct relations with the West while working
for the isolation of Taiwan.
The United States policy makers had a number of incentives
for desiring a better relationship with the People's Republic o f China
because:
The f ir s t consideration of United States policy leaders
involved security and diplomatic factors.

There are many centers of

power in the world today; the United States could use the additional
leverage that China would provide in balancing the Soviet Union.
United States policy makers could not overlook that the Sino-Soviet
s p lit had a profound effect on the world balance of power.
consideration was economics.

A second

American business desired the penetration

of the China market.
The United States leadership desires on the evidence a
re la tiv e ly stable East Asia for the next decade.

The United States
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policy makers do not need to choose a t this juncture between a
Chinese or Soviet relationship.

The United States must balance

relations with both Communist powers.

As far as trade is concerned,

the China market is not a great bonanza.

Normalization of relations

between the People's Republic and the United States has made i t
possible fo r the United States to pursue a more equadistant foreign
policy in its dealing with the two Communist giants.
The Chinese government must consider how they mayobtain
western technology without importing Westernin s titu tio n s .

When

Western ideas and technology are introduced into developing nations,
the trad ition al social and value systems are disrupted.

According

to Newsweek February 5, 1979 the average yearly industrial wage in
China is $360.00 per year compared to the Soviet Union with $3,000.00
and the United States $13,400.00.

I t can be seen that China has a

long way to go before i t catches up with either of the two superpowers.
In terms of economic development China must keep ahead of her popu
latio n growth.

The objective of the Chineseleadership might be to

obtain as great benefits from Taiwan as they

have received

from

Hong Kong.
From the security viewpoint the Teng-Hua leadership realizes
that th e ir nation is much weaker than both the United States and the
Soviet Union.

This alone ju s tifie s the Sino-American rapprochement

in th e ir view.
We must also take into consideration the way in which the
two nations perceive each other.

H is to ric a lly , Sino-American
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relations have alternated between love and hate.

Neither side has

understood the other, and this tension goes back to the nineteenth
century.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who played such

an important part at the historical detente meeting in 1972 was
quoted in the Washington Post in 1973, "No matter what happens in
the United States, friendship with the People's Republic of China
is one of the constant factors of American foreign policy."^

Let

us hope that he is correct.
Future p o litic a l relationships change in both nations,
and p o litic a l relationships and policies often d iffe r .

American

diplomacy should endeavor to establish friendly relations whenever
possible.

Leaders meet, discuss problems, make concessions and often

form a friendship as in the case of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and President
Nixon.
I t is possible to do too much too fast to help developing
nations as was the case in Iran.
individuals.

Nations d iffe r the same as

One may not understand or lik e another c iv iliz a tio n ,

or person, but that does not mean they have to change i t .
Today there is a new s p ir it in China.

China's universities

are now open to the arts as well as to vocations.

Entrance examina

tions are required, and the most talented instructors are selected.
China has great natural resources, and is in need of financial and
technical assistance to develop them.

Hopefully, i t w ill be given

^Hinton, Harold C. Pekinq-Washinqton:
Policy and the United States (Washington, D.C.:

Chinese Foreign
The Center for

Strategic and International Studies Georgetown University, 1976), p. 89.
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by the United States as well as Western Europe and Japan.

The

exploitation of China's o il alone could change the world balance
of that greatly needed resource.
The harmonious progress in relations between the United
States and the People's Republic could change.

The Chinese leaders

believe that the United States government is too preoccupied with
the Soviets and banks too much on the idea of safeguarding the
Soviet-American detente.
Sino-American cooperation may continue to have a narrow
base.

I f the balance of power were to change substantially, i t is

lik e ly that American and Chinese concerns would also change.
I f American strength should decline, under Soviet pressure
the Peking leadership might be forced to turn to the Soviet Union.
Fear of the Soviet leadership is also an important motivating
force for the Chinese regime to maintain close relations with the
United States.

I f the Soviets were to moderate th eir policy along

the Sino-Soviet border, the Peking leaders might find less need for
close relations with the United States.

There are few ties that

actually hold the two nations together—the Sino-American cooperation
is based on strategic grounds.
Regardless of new leadership in China or the Soviet Union,
both nations respect strength and power, and these two qualities must
form the basis of United States policy.
National leaders w ill overlook th e ir stereotyped images
of other states when necessity demands i t .

This was the case in
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the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the
United States.

The leadership of these two states have advanced

from a state of noncommunication to a working relationship of
diplomatic relations.
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APPENDIX A

President Carter began by saying:
Good evening.
I would lik e to read a jo in t communique which is being
simultaneously issued in Peking at this very moment by
leaders of the People's Republic of China.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, JANUARY 1, 1979
The United States of America and the People's Republic
of China have agreed to recognize each other and to
establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.
The United States recognizes the Government of the
People's Republic of China as the sole legal government
of China. Within this context, the people of the United
States w ill maintain cu ltu ra l, commerical, and other
unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
The United States of America and the People's Republic of
China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides
in the Shanghai Communique of 1972 and emphasize once
again that:
. . . both sides wish to reduce the danger of international
m ilita ry c o n flic t. . . '
Members of the news media were waiting impatiently in the
briefing room at the White House to begin the question and answer
ordeal.

The President began by saying:

. . .1 believe this to be an extremely important moment
in the history o f our nation. It 's something that I and
my two predecessors have sought avidly. . . . Only since

Carter, Jimmy. "Diplomatic Relations between the United
States and the People's Republic of China." Address to the Nation
December 15, 1978. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
p. 2264, December 18, 1978.
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the la s t few weeks has there been an increasing
demonstration to us that Premier Hua and Vice Premier
Teng have been ready to normalize relations. I think
the interests of Taiwan have been adequately protected.
One of the briefers w ill explain the details to you. . .
I w ill be preparing myself adequately for the v is it of
Premier Teng. We invited him on one day, he accepted the
next day without delay and I think he's looking forward
to this tr ip with a great deal of anticipation and
pleasure.
I have talked personally this evening with Prime Minister
Ohira (of Japan). Early this morning we notified the
o ffic ia ls in Taiwan. . .1 think that one of the greatest
benefits that w ill be derived is the continuation of
strong trade, cultural relationships with Taiwan, the
people of Taiwan and a new vista for prosperous trade
relationships with almost a b illio n people in the People's
Republic of China. . . '
Q.
Pres.

Q.

Pres.

"How did the Congressional leaders take it?"
"With mixed response. Some of the congressional
leaders who were there have long been very strong
personal friends of the o ffic ia ls in Taiwan. They
are not as thoroughly fam iliar with the o ffic ia ls
in the People's Republic of China."
"Mr. President, you said the response to your speech
would be 'massive' applause throughout the Nation."
What do you think the response to your speech w ill
be in Taiwan?"
"I doubt i f there w ill be massive applause in Taiwan,
but we are going to do everything we can to assure
the Taiwanese. . .th at the well-being of the people
of Taiwan w ill not be damaged.
"To answer the other question, I don't think this w ill
have any adverse effe ct at a ll on the SALT negotiations,
as an independent matter. And I think that the Soviets
. . .have been expecting this development. They were
not surprised. We have kept them informed recen tly."2

^loc. c i t . , pp. 2266-67.
2ib id .
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APPENDIX B

Before his departure fo r Washington, the Vice Premier of the
People's Republic took time out to grant Time, In c ., Editor in Chief
Hedley Donovan and Marsha Clark, Time's Hong Kong bureau ch ief, an
interview.

The meeting took place in the Sinkiang Room of the Great

Hall of the People on Peking's T'ien An Men Squared
Teng began by stating:
"his main message to President Carter: that Sino-American
rapprochement should be turned into an e x p lic it a n tiSoviet alliance. Stressing Sino-America tie s , Ten argued
that the two nations share a common destiny and should
unite with other countries against the Soviet Union. He
said that the Soviet a c tiv itie s around the Mediterranean
l i t t o r a l , in Africa and in Asia should cause concern to
a ll nations. He derided the value of the proposed SALT I I
treaty between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and demonstrated
an acute historical grasp of East-West disarmament negotia
tions."
"
;
When asked, ". . . how do you assess the significance of your
tr ip and what do you hope to accomplish?"
His answer was:
"The significance is mainly reflected in the normalization
of relations between China and the U.S. (because I am)
going there this time as one of China's leaders w i l l , of
course, be of benefit. P articularly at the present time,
the world is quite untranquil and we are faced-with a lo t
of problems. Not only during this v is it but in the
future as w ell, i t w ill be beneficial to have the leaders

^"An interview with Ten Hsiago-ping," Time, February 5, 1979,
pp. 32-35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140

of the U.S. and China frequently contact each other
and exchange views. As for the significance of
normalization between China and the U.S. there has
been much ta lk about i t already, but you cannot afford
to underestimate the significance of this event. One
aspect of i t is the development of relations between the
two countries, but what is ever more important is from
the point of view of global strategy."
Teng was then asked "hegemony" is a word that your govern
ment

has frequently used with reference to the Soviet Union's policy.

The Soviet Union has about 7% of the world's population and 10% of
its production.

How do you assess Soviet policies today, and what

opportunities do you see in the new Sino-American relationship for
countering those policies?

What does hegemony actually mean?

Teng answered by referring to "The Open Letter" that was
published in the New York Times warning that the Soviets were "heading
for superiority, not parity in the m ilita ry arena."

He said,

"I suppose that you have already read the le tte r of
170 retired American generals and admirals. I have read
i t myself and I very much approve of that le tte r . Those
generals have already retired but they are concerned
and that means that the situation is indeed not
tranquil. . . The Soviet m ilita ry budget takes up
around 20% of the gross national product. What does
one do with a ll these things? With no war going on i t
has increased its standing army in three years from
3 m illion men to 4 m illion men. What does one do that
'for?. . . We've already been through two world wars
and both have been started by small incidents. Such
things often develop independent of one's w i l l , perhaps
even independent of the w ill of the present Soviet
leaders."
The subject of hegemonism was fin a lly concluded with:
"Global hegemonism means that you want to control the
whole world (and) there is no scrupple at using war as
a step to achieving hegemonism. But i t would f i r s t
try to attain its aims by intervention, sowing discord,
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or, as they say in Europe, by means of Finlandization.
But in the fin a l analysis i t would use m ilita ry force
and that would be World War I I I . "
The Vice Premier of China was drawn to reports that
"President Carter, Secretary of State Vance and various
members of Congress do not agree with the retired
generals. They think i t possible to have good relations
with the Soviet Union and China at the same time."
Teng merely commented:
" I t is only possible for each individual to express his
point of view of global strategy and international
p o litic s , even where there was no normalization between
China and the U .S., what we are faced with is stark
r e a lity . Reality cannot be changed by any person's
subjective views."
The subject was then changed to "How v/i 11 the new rela tio n 
ship between China and the U.S. help with your Four Modernizations
Campaign?"

Teng answered:

"We believe the normalization of relations w ill enable
us to obtain much s c ie n tific and technological know how
from the point of view of the U.S. . .. We lost a whole
generation as regards education, inlcuding science and
technology. . .From the broader perspective of global
p o litic s i t w ill have even greater benefits. We do
indeed have an ambitious goal."
Then came the touchy question:

"Do you expect Taiwan to

be reunified with the P.R.C. within ten years."
" . . . I hope i t w ill be realized this year, but that
is probably being too impatient
Our policy and
principles fo r reunification are very f a ir and reason
able. We w ill respect the re a litie s on Taiwan, and the
Taiwanese authorities as a local government and w ill
retain th e ir rights and powers, but i t must be within
the context of one China. That means that they can
maintain a certain amount of th e ir own armed forces.
As fo r trade with foreign countries, they can continue.
They may also maintain th e ir present system and continue
leading th e ir own way of l i f e . . . We demand of them only
that there w ill be no two Chinas and that patriots a ll
belong to the same family.
That sounds well fo r the present leadership.

Will the new

policy directions be changed with future regimes?
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